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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most famous trilogies ever published ends with the
hero, Frodo the hobbit, sailing aboard an elven ship from the Grey
Havens of Middle Earth to the Undying Lands in the west.1 Despite
this being the third in a series of “Biotechnology Patent Law Top Ten”
articles, in this trilogy the world of biotechnology patent law has no
leading hero, no ultimate destination, nor any final resolution of issues. To the contrary, this exciting area of law and technology continues to witness winners and losers in myriad battles across a wide doctrinal theatre of legal war with no end in sight. It is true that some in
biotechnology view the uncertainty surrounding the scope of patentable biotechnological subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as a metaphorical ring they wish the fires of Mount Doom could destroy (or at
least clarified by the United States Supreme Court). Others consider
the ongoing patent disputes between the University of California, University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier (often referred to collectively as “CVC”) and the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard to be
as consequential as the Battle of the Five Armies.2 We will not even
try to compare the endless Abbreviated New Drug Application
(“ANDA”) struggles between brand pharmaceutical companies and
their upstart generic drug firm rivals using a literary device derived
from The Lord of the Rings.3 Suffice it to say that biotechnology patent
law will continue to vigorously evolve, and we plan to continue our
coverage of its evolution beyond the current trilogy of Biotechnology
Patent Law Top Tens.
As in previous years, we admit it was difficult to choose precisely
ten top biotechnology patent law decisions. There are certainly others
1. See generally, J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS: THE RETURN OF
KING (1955).
2. See generally, Jon Cohen, The Latest Round in the CRISPR Patent Battle has
an Apparent Victor, but the Fight Continues, SCIENCE (Sept. 11, 2020, 6:40 PM),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/09/latest-round-crispr-patent-battle-hasapparent-victor-fight-continues [https://perma.cc/GX25-VGQT]; Jon Brooks, Making Sense of the CRISPR Patent Dispute Between the University of California and
Broad, KQED (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.kqed.org/science/1938007/makingsense-of-the-crispr-patent-dispute-between-the-university-of-california-and-broad
[https://perma.cc/PU44-F77Q].
3. See generally, Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), FDA (May 22,
2019), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/abbreviated-new-drug-app
lication-anda#:~:text=An%20abbreviated%20new%20drug%20application,brand
%2Dname%20drug%20it%20references [https://perma.cc/S6QB-TB5K]; ANDA
LITIGATION: STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR PHARMACEUTICAl PATENT LITIGATORS
(Kenneth L. Dorsney, ed., 3d ed. 2020).
THE
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we did not include that warrant close attention for their reasonings,
rules, and future implications. Nevertheless, both we and our readers
can count, so we have done our best to select what we consider to be
the top ten biotechnology patent law decisions of 2020. We discuss
these decisions below.
II. TOP TEN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT LAW CASES OF 2020
A. GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.4
1. What Quantum of Culpable Conduct Is Required for an ANDA
Applicant to Induce Infringement?
“The back-and-forth, (almost) cat-and-mouse-like competition
between branded innovator and generic drug makers sanctioned under
the Hatch–Waxman Act has been on-going for over 30 years.”5 As
part of this regime, Congress has provided a pathway for generic drug
companies to obtain the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) approval for less than all the indications a branded drug has obtained,
using a “carve out” strategy resulting in a so-called “skinny label. “6
This has raised the possibility of “off-label” use, where physicians prescribe the generic drug for an indication not approved for the generic
drug but known to be clinically appropriate from the innovator’s approval for the product. The extent to which a generic drug company
can use this strategy to avoid liability for inducing infringement was
tested in the Federal Circuit’s decision in GlaxoSmithKline LLC v.
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.7 The matter arose in litigation over
GSK’s Coreg product (carvedilol) for treatment of hypertension (the
initial approved indication; U.S. Patent No. 4,503,067), congestive
heart failure (“CHF”) (the subject of U.S. Patent No. 5,760,069), and
left ventricular dysfunction following myocardial infarction (“LVDMI”).8 The ’069 patent recites a method of treating CHF with a

4. GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 976 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2020).
5. Kevin Noonan, GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
(Fed. Cir. 2020), JD SUPRA (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews
/glaxosmithkline-llc-v-teva-19567/ [https://perma.cc/33YA-6ZBD]; see also Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, S. 1538, 98th Cong. (1984).
6. GlaxoSmithKline, 976 F.3d at 1360.
7. Id. at 1367.
8. Id. at 1349.
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combination of carvedilol and “one or more of an angiotensin-converting enzyme (“ACE”) inhibitor, a diuretic, and digoxin.”9
Teva’s ANDA was filed with a Paragraph III certification over
the ’067 patent and a Paragraph IV certification over the ’069 patent.10
The FDA tentatively approved Teva’s generic product for “treatment
of hypertension” and “congestive heart failure,” which Teva launched
on expiration of the ’067 patent.11 Teva’s label indicated that the product was approved treatment of LVD-MI and hypertension and announced that FDA had given its product an “AB rating,” which the
opinion explained “allow[s] users to determine quickly whether the
Agency has evaluated a particular approved product as therapeutically
equivalent to other pharmaceutically equivalent products.”12 Thereafter, FDA required Teva to amend its label to be identical to the GSK
label for Coreg®, which introduced treatment of heart failure into the
approved treatments recited in Teva’s label.13
GSK filed for reissue of the ’069 patent, which was duly granted
by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office as Reissue Patent No.
RE40,000; claim 1 is representative of the invention as claimed in the
’000 reissue patent:14
1. A method of decreasing mortality caused by congestive
heart failure in a patient in need thereof which comprises administering a therapeutically acceptable amount of carvedilol
in conjunction with one or more other therapeutic agents,
said agents being selected from the group consisting of an
angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor (ACE), a diuretic,
and digoxin, wherein the administering comprises administering to said patient daily maintenance dosages for a
maintenance period to decrease a risk of mortality caused by
congestive heart failure, and said maintenance period is
greater than six months.15
GSK filed suit against Teva for inducement of infringement on
the Teva label based on direct infringement by physicians prescribing
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1350 n.3 (quoting U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Preface to APPROVED
DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EVALUATIONS (40th ed. 2020) (commonly
known as the Orange Book)).
13. Id. at 1350.
14. Id. at 1349.
15. Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. RE40,000 col. 8, ll. 30–40 (filed Nov. 25, 2003)
(emphasis added)) (where the italicized portion of the claim represents the modifications introduced in the prosecution of the reissue application).
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the drug for the label indications.16 Teva argued that it had “carved
out” the indication for CHF pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii),
resulting in a “skinny label” with regard to this indication.17 Thereafter, FDA compelled Teva to amend its label to include that indication.18 In addition, Teva argued that it could be liable for inducement
only if GSK could show that Teva had “directly communicated with
the direct infringers and ‘caused’ them to directly infringe the method
in the ’000 patent.”19 In a jury instruction the court informed the jury
that the parties could use circumstantial evidence to satisfy this burden.20
The jury found that Teva induced infringement of the ’000 reissue
patent both before and after the label amendment (albeit infringing
several claims after but not before that change).21 The district court
granted Teva’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) on
the basis that GSK had not “caused” physicians to prescribe their product for the infringing uses.22 Because proof of such causation was required, according to the district court, its absence precluded the jury
from basing its decision on substantial evidence.23 The court relied on
the “many sources of information available to prescribing physicians”
other than Teva’s label (including paradoxically GSK’s label and promotion of its Coreg® product) in finding this evidentiary deficiency.24
Also, the court based its decision on physician testimony that their
prescribing behavior relied on “guidelines and research, as well as
their own experience” and not Teva’s label.25 “In sum,” the court said,
“substantial evidence [did] not support the jury’s finding on causation,
and therefore [did] not support its verdict that Teva is liable for induced infringement, during both the skinny and full label periods.”26
This appeal followed.
The Federal Circuit reversed, in an opinion by Judge Newman
and joined by Judge Moore; Chief Judge Prost provided a lengthy,
comprehensive dissent.27 The panel majority relied on the Supreme
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1354; Id. at 1357–58 (Prost, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1350 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1350–51.
Id. at 1351.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1348.
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Court’s decision in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,28 that
copying is evidence of inducement as applied to generic drugs (which
are required by regulatory statutes to “copy”) in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva
Parenteral Medicines., Inc.,29 and Sanofi v. Watson Labs. Inc.30 (as
well as the earlier precedent of AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc.,31 and
Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Medical Device Alliance, Inc.).32 The majority also
found compelling evidence from Teva’s website regarding its product’s AB rating with GSK’s Coreg product and other promotional content as well as testimony from GSK’s witnesses regarding physician
reliance on information from generic drug makers.33
Less persuasive to the Federal Circuit majority was Teva’s evidence regarding “deliberately omit[ting]” reference to CHF in its
skinny label, particularly in light of the continued promotion of the
product by Teva in a manner not consistent with complete exclusion
of the CHF indication (albeit without express inclusion of that indication).34
The panel majority opined that the district court erred in applying
the correct legal standard, stating that “precedent makes clear that
when the provider of an identical product knows of and markets the
same product for intended direct infringing activity, the criteria of induced infringement are met.”35 Considering this precedent, the majority held that “[t]here was ample record evidence of promotional materials, press releases, product catalogs, the FDA labels, and testimony
of witnesses from both sides, to support the jury verdict of inducement
to infringe the designated claims for the period of the ’000 reissue patent.”36 The opinion cites Vanda Pharm. v. West-Ward Pharm. Int’l
Ltd., and Sanofi for the principle that the label’s contents can be evidence of inducement to infringe.37
The majority also takes its opportunity to address (briefly) the Chief
Judge’s dissent, stating that it is not proper for the appellate court to
“find facts afresh” nor to engage in policy arguments regarding FDA
28. 563 U.S. 754, 764 (2011).
29. 845 F.3d 1357, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
30. 875 F.3d 636, 645 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
31. 633 F.3d 1042, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
32. 244 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
33. GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 976 F.3d 1347, 1353–54
(Fed. Cir. 2020).
34. Id. at 1354.
35. Id. at 1355.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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approval standards.38 In the majority’s view, “[t]he implications of the
dissent’s position are vast, and if enforcement of patents on new discoveries varies with the extent to which the patentee has profited from
past discoveries, this is a policy matter for Congress, not a factor in
judicial review of jury verdicts.”39
The majority’s opinion concludes by considering Teva’s objections to the bases for the district court’s damages instructions and calculations, affirming because they concluded that “the jury instructions
are in conformity to law.”40
Chief Judge Prost dissented based, as the majority noted, on her
objections to the quanta of evidence adduced and policy consequences
should the majority’s position be sustained.41 The Chief begins by referencing the need, in her view, for balance between the incentives patents provide for pharmaceutical innovation and the public’s need for
access to that innovation once the patent term has expired, noting that
this was one motivation for Congress to establish the generic drug approval system.42 In the Chief’s view the majority’s decision undermines these policy goals by finding Teva induced infringement by
marketing its generic drug product for “unpatented uses” using its
skinny label.43 The dissent sets out the opinion that Teva acted just as
Congress intended when it enacted the skinny label provisions by
waiting (using its Paragraph III certification) until GSK’s patent had
expired before launching its product for unpatented indications.44 And
Teva’s inclusion on its label of the CHF indication (recited in GSK’s
’000 reissue patent) was compelled by FDA; even then according to
the dissent “there was still no inducement via the full label.”45 The
Chief Judge believes that:
The district court got it right: no evidence established that
Teva actually caused the doctors’ infringement for either label. No communication from Teva encouraged doctors to
use generic carvedilol to practice the patented method. And
no evidence showed that doctors relied on Teva’s label. Indeed, GSK’s own expert admitted that he had not read Teva’s
label before prescribing generic carvedilol. Rather than suggest inducement, the record established that doctors relied on
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1355–56.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1355–56.
Id. at 1357 (Prost, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis in dissent).
Id. at 1358.
Id.
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other sources of information, not Teva, in making their decision to prescribe carvedilol. And in any case, the record
showed that the switch from Coreg® to generic carvedilol
occurred ‘automatically,’ often without doctors’ knowledge
at all.46
The dissent not only disagrees with the majority’s decision but
recognizes that “it nullifies Congress’s statutory provision for skinny
labels—creating liability for inducement where there should be none,”
contrary to Congressional intent and “slowing, rather than speeding,
the introduction of low-cost generics.”47
After stating her opinion, the Chief Judge spends the rest of her
lengthy dissent (at 33 pages, much longer than the majority opinion)
setting forth the following subjects: (1) the statutory background; (2)
the factual and procedural background; (3) the majority nullifies congress’s provision for skinny labels; and (4) the majority misapplies the
law and misconstrues the facts. The bulk of the Chief’s arguments are
in the third and fourth sections of her dissent (as commented upon by
the majority). Regarding the Chief’s opinion that the majority engaged
in judicial nullification of the skinny label option enacted by Congress,
the Chief stated that:
To hold [that Teva infringes based on its label], as the Majority does, undermines Congress’s provision for skinny labels by substantially nullifying section viii. According to the
Majority, a generic company that carves out from its label a
patented method of use can nonetheless be found to infringe
that patented method based on the content of the FDAapproved label. By finding inducement based on Teva’s
skinny label, which was not indicated for—and did not otherwise describe—the patented method, the Majority invites
a claim of inducement for almost any generic that legally enters the market with a skinny label. That is directly contrary
to Congress’s intent.48
The Chief also found Federal Circuit precedent contrary to the majority’s opinion in Takeda Pharmaceuticals U.S.A. v. West-Ward Pharmaceutical Corp. and Warner-Lambert v. Apotex Corp.49 And rather
than finding anything nefarious in Teva’s carveout, the Chief opined

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1366 (internal citation omitted) (citing Caraco Pharm. Lab’ys, Ltd. v.
Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 405–06, (2012); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic,
Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670–71 (1990)).
49. Id. at 1367.
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that Teva “was acting in accordance with Congress’s goals for it” as
sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Caraco Pharm.50
Chief Judge Prost’s disapproval of the majority’s application of
the law to the facts revisited the jury’s determination and the district
court’s consideration that the jury lacked substantial evidence to support its verdict of induced infringement, unavoidably at least, considering if not finding facts afresh as the majority noted in their opinion.51
While not expressly discussed by either the majority or the dissent, there is a hint that the majority was concerned with generic drug
companies improperly relying on the skinny label strategy to profit
from “off-label use” by physicians for the very indication excluded by
the skinny label carveout.52 The majority extended the scrutiny regarding this stratagem perhaps farther than it can reliably be stretched, not
requiring the level of promotion of the carved out indication that
would be expected to attract inducement liability.53 And the dissent
argued strongly regarding the impropriety of the policymaking consequences of the majority’s decision usurping Congress’s role in deciding the extent to which a generic drug company can use the skinny
label strategy to avoid infringement inducement liability.54 It is likely
that (at a minimum) the Court will hear this case en banc; perhaps less
likely, but certainly within the realm of possibility, is Supreme Court
review in light of the important policy considerations raised by the
majority and even more strongly by Chief Judge Prost’s dissent.
B. Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. 55
1. Original Opinion
The Federal Circuit’s decision on subject matter eligibility in the
life sciences came down (by a divided court) in favor of eligibility in
Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc.56 The claims at issue fell into
the third “bucket” of eligibility, being neither diagnostic method
claims (always ineligible at the Federal Circuit) nor method of treatment claims (eligible, at least for now),57 but rather (as denoted in the
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1355 (majority opinion).
52. Id. at 1354.
53. Id. at 1355.
54. Id. at 1365–66.
55. 952 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020), reh’g granted, 814 Fed. App’x 601 (Fed.
Cir. 2020).
56. Id. at 1375.
57. Id. at 1371.
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majority opinion) method of preparation claims,58 a philosophical
cousin to the claims in Rapid Litigation. Management. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc.59 And as an added bonus, Judge Reyna dissented in a manner
that illustrates his thinking on patent eligibility of inventions involving
natural phenomena (and natural products).60
The case arose over U.S. Patent No. 9,580,751 (the “’751 patent”)
and U.S. Patent No. 9,738,931 (the “’931 patent”),61 directed to the
solution of an unexpected difficulty in detecting cell-free fetal DNA
(“cff-DNA”):
[T]he major proportion (generally >90%) of the extracellular
DNA in the maternal circulation is derived from the mother.
This vast bulk of maternal circulatory extracellular DNA renders it difficult, if not impossible, to determine fetal genetic
alternations [sic] . . . from the small amount of circulatory
extracellular fetal DNA.62
The inventors found that cff-DNA was significantly smaller (300-500
bp) than the “interfering” maternal DNA, and thus using admittedly
conventional techniques of size separation the cff-DNA could be isolated and rendered detectable.63
Illumina and Sequenom asserted claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, and 10 of the
’751 patent and claims 1, 2, and 10–14 the ’931 patent against Ariosa
and Roche Diagnostics; the Court considered claim 1 from each patent
to be representative:
’751 patent:
1. A method for preparing a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
fraction from a pregnant human female useful for analyzing
a genetic locus involved in a fetal chromosomal aberration,
comprising:
(a) extracting DNA from a substantially cell-free sample of
blood plasma or blood serum of a pregnant human female
to obtain extracellular circulatory fetal and maternal DNA
fragments;
(b) producing a fraction of the DNA extracted in (a) by:
(i) size discrimination of
(ii) selectively removing the DNA fragments greater
than approximately 500 base pairs,
58. Id.
59. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
60. Illumina, 952 F.3d at 1375 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1368 (majority opinion).
62. Id. at 1369 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 9,580,751 col. 1 ll. 42–50 (filed Feb. 28,
2017)).
63. Id. at 1376 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
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wherein the DNA fraction after (b) comprises a plurality
of genetic loci of the extracellular circulatory fetal and
maternal DNA; and
(c) analyzing a genetic locus in the fraction of DNA produced in (b).64
’931 patent:
1. A method, comprising:
(a) extracting DNA comprising maternal and fetal DNA
fragments from a substantially cell-free sample of blood
plasma or blood serum of a pregnant human female;
(b) producing a fraction of the DNA extracted in (a) by:
(i) size discrimination of extracellular circulatory fetal
and maternal DNA fragments, and
(ii) selectively removing the DNA fragments greater
than approximately 300 base pairs,
wherein the DNA fraction after (b) comprises extracellular circulatory fetal and maternal DNA fragments of
approximately 300 base pairs and less and a plurality of
genetic loci of the extracellular circulatory fetal and maternal DNA fragments; and
(c) analyzing DNA fragments in the fraction of DNA produced in (b).65
The district court on summary judgment held these claims and all asserted claims to be ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the Supreme
Court’s Alice/Mayo test, and this appeal followed.66
The Federal Circuit reversed, in an opinion by Judge Lourie
joined by Judge Moore; Judge Reyna (the author of the Court’s Ariosa
Diagnostics Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. decision)67 dissented. Judge Lourie
got right to the point, stating “[t]his is not a diagnostic case. And it is
not a method of treatment case. It is a method of preparation case.”68
The opinion acknowledged the consistent precedent post-Mayo that
diagnostic method claims are ineligible, and method of treatment
claims are eligible, citing the following from Judge Moore’s dissent
from denial of rehearing en banc in Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo
Collaborative Services, LLC: “Since Mayo, we have held every single
diagnostic claim in every case before us ineligible.”;69 the panel decision in Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services,
64.
l. 57).
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1369–70 (majority opinion) (quoting ’751 Patent at col. 7 l. 54–col. 8
Id. at 1370 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 9,738,931 col. 7 l. 58–col. 8 l. 63).
Id. at 1370–71.
788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Illumina, 952 F.3d at 1371.
927 F.3d 1333, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Moore, J., dissenting).
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LLC;70 Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC;71
and Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC.72 The
panel majority also recognized that the Court had consistently held
method of treatment claims to be patent-eligible, citing Endo Pharm.
Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.;73 Natural Alternatives International,
Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC;74 and, of course, Vanda Pharm.
Inc.75
The majority appreciated a distinction lost on the dissent: “[h]ere,
it is undisputed that the inventors of the ’751 and ’931 patents discovered a natural phenomenon. But at step one of the Alice/Mayo test, ‘it
is not enough to merely identify a patent-ineligible concept underlying
the claim’; we must determine whether that patent-ineligible concept
is what the claim is ‘directed to.’”76
The majority understood the natural phenomenon underlying the
claimed invention to be “that cell-free fetal DNA tends to be shorter
than cell-free maternal DNA in a mother’s bloodstream” despite some
apparent inconsistencies in how at least Roche enunciated its interpretation.77 The critical question as understood by the majority was
“whether the claims are ‘directed to’ that natural phenomenon.”78 The
majority held that the claims did not pertain to the natural phenomenon
but rather to “a patent-eligible method that utilizes it.”79 In support of
this conclusion, Judge Lourie wrote regarding the specificities of the
claims (albeit not the five specificities he identified in his Vanda opinion).80 These include “specific process steps—size discriminating and
selectively removing DNA fragments that are above a specified size
threshold” that increased the relative amount of cff-DNA in the processed sample compared to maternal DNA.81 The claimed method
70. 927 F.3d at 1333–52 (per curiam).
71. 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
72. 760 Fed. App’x 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics,
Inc., 952 F.3d 1367, 1371–73 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
73. 919 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
74. 918 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
75. Vanda Pharms. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d. 1117 (Fed.
Cir. 2018); Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 952 F.3d 1367, 1371 (2020),
reh’g granted, 814 Fed. App’x 601 (2020).
76. Illumina, 952 F.3d at 1371 (citing Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect,
Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
77. Id. at 1372.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See generally Vanda Pharms. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d
1117, 1123–40 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
81. Illumina, 952 F.3d at 1372.
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“change[d] the composition of the mixture” and produced a DNAcontaining fraction that was different from what naturally occurs in
maternal blood.82 This was what distinguished, for the majority, what
was claimed from merely “observing that fetal DNA is shorter than
maternal DNA or detecting the presence of that phenomenon.”83
The written description of the invention (upon which the dissent
extensively relied to draw the opposite conclusion) supported this
view, according to the opinion:
As described by the specification, the inventors used these
concrete process steps, not merely to observe the presence of
the phenomenon that fetal DNA is shorter than maternal
DNA, but rather to exploit that discovery in a method for
preparation of a mixture enriched in fetal DNA.84
The panel majority distinguished the decision in Ariosa, where the
claims were directed to a method “‘for detecting a paternally inherited
nucleic acid’ (claims 1 and 24) or a method ‘for performing a prenatal
diagnosis’ (claim 25).”85 The only steps recited in those claims were
related to making more of the cff-DNA by amplification, followed by
a detecting or sequencing step. As in Mayo, Athena, and Cleveland
Clinic, the Sequenom claims were directed to detecting a natural phenomenon: the Sequenom inventors “discovered that cell-free fetal
DNA exists, and then obtained patent claims that covered only the
knowledge that it exists and a method to see that it exists.”86 Those
claims were thus ineligible. In contrast, the claims at issue here were
not directed to the correlation between cff-DNA size and its “tendency” to be maternal or fetal in origin. The claims at issue here involved a produced fraction enriched in fetal DNA, which distinguished them from the invalid claims in Ariosa for the panel
majority.87
And regarding the effect the Supreme Court’s AMP v. Myriad Genetics88 decision has on these claims, the majority states:
Thus, in Myriad, the claims were ineligible because they
covered a gene rather than a process for isolating it. Here, we
encounter the opposite situation, i.e., the claims do not cover
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1373.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576
(2013).
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cell-free fetal DNA itself but rather a process for selective
removal of non-fetal DNA to enrich a mixture in fetal DNA.
Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in Myriad is not on
point.89
With regard to the CellzDirect precedent, the panel majority analogized by noting that those inventors did not “invent” hepatocytes but
rather invented a method for making preparations of them that relied
on the hepatocytes natural ability to be subjected to multiple rounds of
freezing and thawing unappreciated in the prior art.90 For the majority,
the ’751 and ’931 patents similarly do not claim (and the inventors do
not assert they had invented) cff-DNA or even the differential size distribution between maternal and fetal DNA in maternal blood.91 The
panel majority recognized that the inventors here relied on this natural
phenomenon to invent a method of separating cff-DNA into an enriched fraction by “physical process steps” that “selectively remove
some maternal DNA in blood to produce a mixture enriched in fetal
DNA.”92
The majority summarized its opinion as follows:
The inventors here patented methods of preparing a DNA
fraction. The claimed methods utilize the natural phenomenon that the inventors discovered by employing physical process steps to selectively remove larger fragments of cell-free
DNA and thus enrich a mixture in cell-free fetal DNA.93
Judge Reyna dissented; his dissent nicely set forth the philosophical
differences between the members of this court (as well as the Supreme
Court) for whom the eligibility/ineligibility dichotomy is categorical:
once a “natural phenomenon” is identified, the invention cannot be
patented (despite Judge Reyna’s protestations at the end of his dissent
that “process claims that involve naturally occurring phenomena from
beginning to end could be directed to patent eligible subject matter,
but this is not such a case”—there will never be such a case).94
The dissent recites the conventional view that applying routine,
well-understood, and conventional methods to a newly discovered natural phenomenon is enough, per se, to preclude patent eligibility.95
What Judge Reyna continues to refuse to acknowledge (and he is not
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Illumina, 952 F.3d at 1373–74.
Id. at 1374.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1383 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1377 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
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alone in this particular brand of short-sightedness) is that there is nothing routine, well understood, and conventional (and cannot be) in using old techniques in new ways. Indeed, there would be very little patenting if the use of older technology could not be a part of innovation;
after all, the goal of building a better mousetrap would be considerably
more difficult if the existence of a mousetrap itself precluded patenting
a better one.
Judge Reyna states that “the claims are directed to a natural phenomenon [because the] patents only claimed advance is the discovery
of that natural phenomenon,” which for him categorically precludes
patent eligibility.96 Ignoring the fact that the claimed methods permit
cff-DNA to be detected, in his view “[t]he inventors discovered a natural phenomenon: that cff-DNA tends to be shorter than cell-free maternal DNA in a mother’s blood . . . . Other than the surprising discovery, nothing else in the specification or the record before us indicates
there was anything new or useful about the claimed invention.”97 And
he disregards the distinction drawn by the majority between “method
of preparation” claims and method of treatment or diagnostic claims,
stating that “[a] ‘method of preparation case’ is treated no differently
than any other process claim under our law,”98 not considering the differential treatment (even by Justice Breyer in Mayo) between cases
like Parker v. Flook99 and Diamond v. Diehr.100
Regarding the significance of the written description to the question of whether the claims are “directed to” a natural phenomenon, the
dissent appears to assert that if the invention identifies or recites a natural phenomenon, it is per se directed to the natural phenomenon,
wherein the written description supports ineligibility merely by identifying the natural phenomenon (and seemingly equating an invention
“based on” a natural phenomenon with one that is directed to it):
If a written description highlights the discovery of a natural
phenomenon—e.g., by describing the natural phenomenon
as the only ‘surprising’ or ‘unexpected’ aspect of the invention or that the invention is “based on the discovery” of a
natural law—the natural phenomenon likely constitutes the
claimed advance.101
96. Id. at 1375.
97. Id. at 1376 (internal citations omitted).
98. Id. at 1377.
99. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
100. 450 U.S. 175 (1981); the majority discusses these cases in Illumina, 952 F.3d
at 1370-71 (Lourie, J., majority opinion).
101. Illumina, 952 F.3d at 1378 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (citing Ariosa Diagnostics,
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(Somewhat annoyingly, the dissent consistently brackets the term
“surprising” with quotation marks;102 a jurist does not need to agree
that “surprisingness” is enough to confer patent eligibility, but there is
nothing in the record to refute that the results were surprising to one
of ordinary skill in the art, the only actor whose “surprise” at the discovery is legally relevant).
Touching sub silentio on how the Court has interpreted claims
involving natural products after Myriad, the dissent further states that
ineligibility is supported by “[t]he fact that the claimed method steps
begin and end with a naturally occurring substance, as in Ariosa” and
that “[t]he inventors did not create or alter any of the genetic information encoded in the cff-DNA in the claimed method steps,”103
which seems on its face to be contrary to the Supreme Court’s Diamond v. Chakrabarty104 decision. Nevertheless, Judge Reyna states:
Likewise, the claimed method here begins and ends with a
naturally occurring substance. The claimed method begins
with extracting a sample of blood plasma or serum from a
pregnant mother that consists wholly of various naturally occurring substances, including cff-DNA. The claimed method
separates those naturally occurring substances by size, leaving a “fraction” of the original sample that is predominantly
cff-DNA. The claimed method ends with analyzing the components of the “fraction,” which contains cff-DNA. The substances present throughout the process are naturally occurring substances, and the claimed method steps do not alter
those substances [except, of course, by enriching them in the
resulting fraction]. The claimed method is therefore directed
to a natural phenomenon.105
The dissent is also focused on whether the claims constitute an “advance” in the art (ignoring the “advance” that the invention permits
analyzing cff-DNA): “[w]here a written description identifies a technology as well-known or performed using commercially available
tools or kits, that technology cannot logically constitute a claimed advance.”106
Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Athena Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d 743, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2019); and
Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1360–61
(Fed. Cir. 2017)).
102. See id. (using quotation marks around the word “surprising” five times
within one page).
103. Id.
104. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
105. Illumina, 952 F.3d at 1378 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
106. Id. at 1379 (citing Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1378; Athena, 915 F.3d at 751)
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There is an apparent difference between how the majority and the
dissent consider the Court’s CellzDirect precedent. Judge Reyna appreciates as a distinction that, in CellzDirect, “the inventors created a
new and useful cryopreservation technique comprising multiple
freeze-thaw cycles” that “went beyond applying a known laboratory
technique to a newly discovered natural phenomenon and, instead,
created an entirely new laboratory technique.”107 The claim in the
CellzDirect case does not support this interpretation:
1. A method of producing a desired preparation of multi-cryopreserved hepatocytes, said hepatocytes being capable of
being frozen and thawed at least two times, and in which
greater than 70% of the hepatocytes of said preparation are
viable after the final thaw, said method comprising:
(A) subjecting hepatocytes that have been frozen and
thawed to density gradient fractionation to separate viable
hepatocytes from nonviable hepatocytes,
(B) recovering the separated viable hepatocytes, and
(C) cryopreserving the recovered viable hepatocytes to
thereby form said desired preparation of hepatocytes without requiring a density gradient step after thawing the
hepatocytes for the second time, wherein the hepatocytes
are not plated between the first and second cryopreservations, and wherein greater than 70% of the hepatocytes of
said preparation are viable after the final thaw.108
The only difference between the conventional method of cryopreservation and the claimed invention was that the claims direct that conventional methods be performed twice.109 It is ironic that this repetition is sufficient to distinguish the claims here under these
circumstances.
The biggest risk of the philosophy enunciated in this dissent is
this: “The Majority’s reasoning is shortsighted. A process that merely
changes the composition of a sample of naturally occurring substances, without altering the naturally occurring substances themselves, is not patent eligible.”110
(identifying the claimed “immunological assay techniques [as] known per se in the
art” and therefore not the claimed advance); and Cleveland Clinic, 859 F.3d at 1361
(relying on the patent’s disclosure of “commercially available testing kits” for detecting the natural law).
107. Id. at 1378.
108. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1046 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (referencing U.S. Patent No. 7,604,929 (filed Apr. 21, 2005)).
109. Id. at 1050–51.
110. Illumina, 952 F.3d at 1381 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (citing Genetic Techs. Ltd.
v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2016); and Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1373;
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If this was ever to be the law it would preclude on patent eligibility grounds claims to any natural product that differed solely by its
isolation and concentration, again seemingly contrary to Supreme
Court precedent.
2. Revised Opinion: Federal Circuit Hands Down Modified Opinion
in Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc.
Earlier in 2020, the Federal Circuit (somewhat surprisingly)
found claims of two Sequenom patents directed to methods for detecting fetal DNA in maternal blood to satisfy the subject matter eligibility
requirements of Section 101.111 The surprise arose in part due to the
Federal Circuit’s track record of finding all diagnostic method claims
to be ineligible as being directed to a natural law without “something
more” to overcome the patentability preclusion created by the Supreme Court in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.112 Another reason, of course, is that the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of patent ineligibility in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc.113 Nevertheless, a divided panel found a patent eligibility—creating distinction in the claims asserted in this case (over a
dissent by the author of the Ariosa v. Sequenom decision, Judge
Reyna)—and today the court issued a revised opinion in the face of
Ariosa’s petition for rehearing.
To recap, the case arose over the ’751 patent and the ’931 patent
and directed to the solution of an unexpected difficulty in detecting
cff-DNA:114
[T]he major proportion (generally >90%) of the extracellular
DNA in the maternal circulation is derived from the mother.
This vast bulk of maternal circulatory extracellular DNA renders it difficult, if not impossible, to determine fetal genetic
alternations [sic] . . . from the small amount of circulatory
extracellular fetal DNA.115
The inventors found that cff-DNA was significantly smaller (300-500
bp) than the “interfering” maternal DNA, and thus, using admittedly
both of which involved claims reciting PCR amplification of specific DNA sequences).
111. See id. at 1375 (majority opinion).
112. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
113. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
114. Illumina, 952 F.3d at 1368.
115. Id. at 1369.
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conventional techniques of size separation the cff-DNA could be isolated and rendered detectable.116
Illumina and Sequenom asserted claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, and 10 of the
’751 patent and claims 1, 2, and 10–14 of the ’931 patent against Ariosa and Roche Diagnostics; the court considered claim 1 from each
patent to be representative:117
’751 patent:
A method for preparing a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) fraction from a pregnant human female useful for analyzing a
genetic locus involved in a fetal chromosomal aberration,
comprising:
(a) extracting DNA from a substantially cell-free sample of
blood plasma or blood serum of a pregnant human female
to obtain extracellular circulatory fetal and maternal DNA
fragments;
(b) producing a fraction of the DNA extracted in (a) by:
(i) size discrimination of
(ii) selectively removing the DNA fragments greater
than approximately 500 base pairs,
wherein the DNA fraction after (b) comprises a plurality
of genetic loci of the extracellular circulatory fetal and
maternal DNA; and
(c) analyzing a genetic locus in the fraction of DNA produced in (b).118
’931 patent:
A method, comprising:
(a) extracting DNA comprising maternal and fetal DNA
fragments from a substantially cell-free sample of blood
plasma or blood serum of a pregnant human female;
(b) producing a fraction of the DNA extracted in (a) by:
(i) size discrimination of extracellular circulatory fetal
and maternal DNA fragments, and
(ii) selectively removing the DNA fragments greater
than approximately 300 base pairs,
wherein the DNA fraction after (b) comprises extracellular circulatory fetal and maternal DNA fragments of
approximately 300 base pairs and less and a plurality of
genetic loci of the extracellular circulatory fetal and maternal DNA fragments; and
(c) analyzing DNA fragments in the fraction of DNA produced in (b).119
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1369–70.
Id. at 1368–69.
Id. at 1369–70.
Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 3d 925, 929 (N.D.
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The district court on summary judgment held these claims and all asserted claims are ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the Supreme
Court’s Alice/Mayo test, and Illumina appealed.120
In the original opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed in an opinion
by Judge Lourie and joined by Judge Moore; Judge Reyna dissenting
(as he does in this revised opinion).121 Judge Lourie justified the different outcome here by stating “[t]his is not a diagnostic case. And it
is not a method of treatment case. It is a method of preparation
case.”122 But the majority based its decision on this distinction:
“[h]ere, it is undisputed that the inventors of the ’751 and ’931 patents
discovered a natural phenomenon. But at step one of the Alice/Mayo
test, ‘it is not enough to merely identify a patent-ineligible concept
underlying the claim; we must determine whether that patent-ineligible concept is what the claim is ‘directed to.’”123 It is undisputed that
cff-DNA exists in maternal blood, its presence is a natural phenomenon, and moreover that the size differentials and distributions that
form the predicate basis for the claims at issue here are also naturally
occurring.124 But the panel majority held that the claims were not
merely “directed to” that natural phenomenon but rather to a method
that exploits the natural phenomenon that renders the claims patenteligible.125 Sounding a theme he first enunciated in Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals, Judge Lourie recognizes the distinction that the claims at issue recited “specific process
steps—size discriminating and selectively removing DNA fragments
that are above a specified size threshold” that increased the relative
amount of cff-DNA in the processed sample compared to maternal
Cal. 2018), rev’d and remanded, 952 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020), opinion modified
and superseded on reh’g, 967 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2020), and reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn, 814 F. App’x 601 (Fed. Cir. 2020), and rev’d and remanded, 967
F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
120. 356 F. Supp. 3d at 935; Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 952 F.3d
1367, 1368 (Fed. Cir.), opinion modified and superseded on reh’g, 967 F.3d 1319
(Fed. Cir. 2020), and reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn, 814 F. App’x 601 (Fed.
Cir. 2020).
121. Illumina, 952 F.3d at 1375; Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 967
F.3d 1319, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2020), reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn, 814 F. App’x
601 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
122. Illumina, 967 F.3d at 1325.
123. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
124. Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 952 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2020).
125. Id.
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DNA and thus, “change[d] the composition of the mixture” and produced a DNA-containing fraction that was different from what naturally occurs in maternal blood.126
Judge Lourie’s latest opinion reiterates most of these themes. The
basis of the decision remains that “this is not a diagnostic case. And it
is not a method of treatment. It is a method of preparation.”127 As in
the original opinion, the panel majority are somewhat critical of appellants’ inability (in the majority’s view) to “clearly identify the natural phenomenon that forms the basis of its challenge” but finds that
the parties’ differences on this point to be relatively meaningless distinctions and adopts Illumina’s definition that the natural phenomenon
underlying the claimed invention is that “cell-free fetal DNA tends to
be shorter than cell-free maternal DNA in a mother’s bloodstream.”128
But the majority arrives at the same conclusion as before: although the
claims are based on this natural phenomenon they “are not directed to
that natural phenomenon but rather to a patent-eligible method that
utilizes it.”129
And the basis of this conclusion relies at least in part on the specific method steps recited by the claims, which might constitute the
ineluctable “something more” mandated by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that looks enough like novelty to disturb any patent practitioner (or more likely scholar) concerned with doctrinal consistency.
But this insistence also cabins the scope of the claims to the specifically recited steps, which goes a long way towards avoiding the overbroad scope that seems to have been at least part of the Supreme
Court’s concern regarding preemption motivating the Court’s attempts
to restrict patent eligibility of certain types of claims. Also important
for the panel majority is that the choice of the size distinctions recited
in the claims are not themselves natural phenomenon but are “humanengineered parameters that optimize the amount of maternal DNA that
is removed from the mixture and the amount of fetal DNA that remains
in the mixture in order to create an improved end product that is more
useful for genetic testing than the original natural extracted blood sample.”130 And the result of the claimed methods are a mixture of DNA
fragments having a change in their composition, being enriched in
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1371.
128. Id. at 1372.
129. Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 967 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (emphasis in opinion).
130. Id.
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fetal-derived DNA fragments shorter than 500 (the ’751 patent) or 300
(the ’931 patent) base pairs.131
The opinion, like its earlier version, distinguishes the claims at
issue here from the claims in Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent found to be patent-ineligible. Most notably these claims are not
directed to the isolated DNA itself,132 detecting its presence in maternal blood (Ariosa), or even determining “whether a cell-free DNA
fragment in a previously-prepared sample is fetal or maternal based on
the natural size distribution of cell-free DNA fragments.” Rather the
claims involved methods for preparing a mixture enriched in cff-DNA
based on “conventional separation technologies can be used in unconventional ways,” specifically the claimed thresholds of 500 bp and 300
bp for separating fetal from maternal DNA.133
An admittedly cursory comparison between the majority opinion
issued in March and the one issued today finds precious little difference in the reasoning advanced by the Court. In contrast, Judge
Reyna’s dissent appears to refine some of the judges’ arguments but
at bottom reiterates his opinion that these claims are directed to a patent-ineligible natural phenomenon.
The Court is properly not transparent regarding the internal discussions and arguments asserted by those judges who share the majority’s views and those who share Judge Reyna’s views. But in light of
the great similarities of these opinions, it seems apparent that the Court
was most comfortable not deciding to hear the case as a result of the
revisions occasioned in the opinion handed down today. Whether there
are additional motivations (including putting the panel’s disparate
views in better condition for Supreme Court review), may become apparent if the Court decides to revisit what it has wrought in the years
since deciding the proper metes and bounds of Section 101 became a
priority for the Court.
C. Valeant Pharmaceuticals Int’l v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.134
Summary judgment, while clearly advantageous, requires that
there be no disputed question of material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When a district court
grants judgment improvidently, by misapplying the law, judgment can
131. Id.
132. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 596
(2013).
133. Illumina, 967 F.3d at 1327–28.
134. 955 F.3d 25 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
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be reversed, and the matter returned to the court for proceedings under
the correct application of the law.135
These are the circumstances that resulted in the opinion of the
Federal Circuit in Valeant Pharmaceuticals International v. Mylan
Pharmaceuticals Inc.136
This ANDA litigation arose over defendants’ attempt to obtain
regulatory approval under the Hatch–Waxman Act for generic formulations of Relistor (“methylnaltrexone”); in particular, ones having
certain stability properties that the inventors of the Orange Book-listed
patents had shown depended on the pH of the formulation.137 In particular, methylnaltrexone is stable in aqueous solution when the pH of
the formulation is adjusted to remain between 3.0 and 4.0.138 Claim 1
of U.S. Patent No. 8,552,025 recites to such formulations; claim 8 was
at issue in the litigation:
1. A stable pharmaceutical preparation comprising a solution
of methylnaltrexone or a salt thereof, wherein the preparation
comprises a pH between about 3.0 and about 4.0.139
8. The pharmaceutical preparation of claim 1, wherein the
preparation is stable to storage for 24 months at about room
temperature.140
ANDA Plaintiff Valeant brought suit, and Defendant Mylan stipulated
to infringement but contended that asserted claim 8 was obvious, under a stipulated claim construction that
the phrase ‘the preparation is stable to storage for 24 months
at about room temperature’ means ‘the methylnaltrexone
degradation products in the preparation do not exceed 2.0%
of the total methylnaltrexone present in the preparation and
the preparation is suitable for pharmaceutical use when
stored for 24 months at room temperature.’141
The district court granted Valeant’s motion for summary judgment; in
doing so, the court “rejected Mylan’s expert testimony and cited references as being insufficient, largely because the references did not
teach methylnaltrexone formulations but instead formulations of similar but different compounds, naloxone and naltrexone.”142 In addition,
135. Id. at 34.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 27–28.
138. Id. at 28.
139. Id. at 27.
140. Valeant Pharms. Int’l v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 955 F.3d 25, 27 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (citing U.S. Patent No. 8,552,025 col. 19 ll. 44–46 (filed Dec. 16, 2009)).
141. Id. at 28.
142. Id.
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the district court rejected Mylan’s second argument that using the
claimed pH range would have been obvious to try.143
On appeal the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded in an opinion by Judge Lourie and joined by Judges Reyna and Hughes.144 Relevant to the panel’s decision (unavoidable perhaps in view of Judge
Lourie’s background in chemistry), the opinion notes the resemblances between methylnaltrexone and the prior art compounds naltrexone and naloxone; as set forth in the opinion, these differences are
small:
The only structural difference between these three molecules
is the identity of the functional group attached to the nitrogen
atom. Naloxone is a neutral tertiary amine. Naltrexone, also
a neutral tertiary amine, has a cyclopropylmethyl group attached to the nitrogen. Methylnaltrexone, a derivative of naltrexone, is a quaternary ammonium salt and has both a cyclopropylmethyl group and a methyl group attached to its
nitrogen with a positive charge.145
The district court summarily dismissed Mylan’s argument regarding
the prior art due to these differences, basing its conclusion on the
grounds that what the art taught for naloxone and naltrexone would
not have provided sufficient guidance to the skilled worker to appreciate that the prior art teachings would be relevant to methylnaltrexone.146 This basis for the district court’s decision is important because
U.S. Patent No 5,866,154 taught that naloxone formulations were stabilized at pH 3.0–3.5, and U.S. Patent Application Publication No.
2003/0229111 taught that naltrexone formulations could be stabilized
with various organic acids (including butylated hydroxytoluene and
ascorbic acid) having a pH adjusted to between 3.0 and 5.0 but preferably pH 4.0.147 In addition, there were pharmaceutical treatises
teaching the benefits of maintaining the pH for formulations of this
general class of compounds at acidic pH.148
The Federal Circuit held that the district court’s disregard for the
prior art on this basis was an error and found that Mylan had asserted
a prima facie case of obviousness precluding summary judgment,

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
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citing In re Peterson149 in support of its decision to reverse.150 The
opinion states that such a prima facie case exists when there is, as here,
an overlap in ranges of a property or characteristic of a claimed composition.151
The court recognized the underlying question of “whether prior
art ranges for solutions of structurally and functionally similar compounds that overlap with a claimed range can establish a prima facie
case of obviousness,” holding that “they can, and in this case, do.”152
Structurally similar compounds are expected by skilled artisans to
have similar properties, according to the opinion,153 citing Daiichi
Sankyo Co. v. Matrix Laboratories., Ltd.,154 In re Deuel,155 In re
Merck & Co., Inc.,156 Application of Payne,157 and In re Rosselet.158
The opinion recognizes that this case law focuses on compounds and
uses thereof, but the court maintained that “the principle established
in these cases applies more broadly: a person of skill in the art can
expect that compounds with common properties are likely to share
other related properties as well.”159 Further, relevant to the question
before the panel, “[w]hen compounds share significant structural and
functional similarity, those compounds are likely to share other properties, including optimal formulation for long-term stability.”160
The opinion then recites the similarities between the prior art on
naloxone, naltrexone, and methylnaltrexone, including that they are
all opioid antagonists and bind to opioid receptors but do not activate
them; they are all oxymorphone derivatives with only minor structural
variations limited to substituents attached to the same nitrogen atom
(naloxone and naltrexone being uncharged tertiary amines differing by
substitution of a cyclopropylmethyl group in the latter, while methylnaltrexone is charged and has quaternary ammonium salt substituted
149. Id. at 33.
150. Id. at 31–32.
151. Id. at 32.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 619 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc)).
155. 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
156. 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
157. 606 F.2d 303, 314 (C.C.P.A 1979) (citing In re Wood, 582 F.2d 638, 641
(C.C.P.A 1978)).
158. 347 F.2d 847, 850 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
159. Valeant Pharms., Int’l v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 955 F.3d 25, 32 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (citing Anacor Pharms., Inc. v. Iancu, 889 F.3d 1372, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
160. Valeant, 955 F.3d at 32–33.
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by both a cyclopropylmethyl group and a methyl group).161 According
to the opinion, “[b]ecause of the strong structural and functional similarity between the molecules, a person of skill could expect similar
stability of the molecules at similar pH ranges in solution” (a conclusion that seems inconsistent with the significant differences, inter alia,
with the molecule comprising the claimed formulation being positively charged at neutral pH while the compounds comprising the prior
art formulations were not).162
But the opinion makes the point that the district court erred because the similarities were sufficient to preclude summary judgment.163 It makes the further point that courts should not construe the
Federal Circuit’s opinion to mean that “molecules with similar structure and similar function can always be expected to exhibit similar
properties for formulation.”164 Rather, the case deserved to be tried by
a factfinder (here, the district court) to determine whether Valeant can
overcome Mylan’s prima facie obviousness case.
The opinion next turned to the district court’s summary rejection
of Mylan’s obvious-to-try argument. This rejection was expressly
based on the “infinite” values of pH between pH 3.0 and pH 7.0 as a
matter of “basic math.”165 Further, the district court refused to credit
Mylan’s experts’ testimony regarding the skilled artisan’s apprehension that adjusting pH could improve stability because the evidence
did not show that adjusting pH would have been the first variable the
artisan would have considered.166 The district court further did not accept that improved long-term methylnaltrexone stability would be a
predictable result of adjusting formulation pH to between 3.0 and
4.0.167
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court on this argument as
well, citing the eternal aphorism from KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. that, “[w]hen there is a design need or market pressure to
solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the
known options within his or her technical grasp.”168 For Judge Lourie
and the panel, the “bounded range of pH 3 to [pH]4” fell within the
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id. (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007)).
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scope of the Supreme Court’s teachings as a “finite number” of pH
values for the skilled artisan to try.169 While it may be a matter of math
that there are an infinite number of numerical values between the numbers 3 and 4, and as a practical matter, the panel found that there was
“no indication that pH is measured to any significant figure beyond
two digits.”170 The panel also found there is no requirement in the law
that a variable (to support an obvious-to-try determination) must be
the first variable that the skilled artisan would consider. “Absolute predictability that the proposed pH range would yield the exact stability
parameters in the claim is not required,” according to the opinion, and
thus the district court erred in granting summary judgment in the face
of this argument as well.171
The Federal Circuit sent the case back to the district court for further action under the principles set forth in the opinion.
D. Genentech, Inc. v. Immunex Rhode Island Corp.172
In a procedurally unusual decision (but one unsurprising in all
other respects), the Federal Circuit on Monday affirmed a district
court’s denial of a temporary restraining order to keep off the market
Amgen’s biosimilar product, Mvasi, in Genentech, Inc. v. Immunex
Rhode Island Corp.173
The issue arose over the notice of commercial marketing requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(A): “The subsection (k) applicant
shall provide notice to the reference product sponsor not later than 180
days before the date of the first commercial marketing of the biological product licensed under subsection (k).”174
“Genentech manufactures and sells bevacizumab, a biological
product used to treat certain types of cancer, under the name Avastin.”175 The FDA granted approval for Amgen’s biosimilar, Mvasi, on
September 14, 2017, and Amgen provided notice of intent to commercially market on October 6, 2017.176 However, Amgen did not market
at that time but filed supplements to its abbreviated biologic licensing
application (“aBLA”) in August 2018, wherein Amgen added a new
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id.
964 F.3d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
See id.
Id. at 1111.
Id. at 1110.
Id.
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manufacturing facility and amended its label.177 Amgen decided to
launch on July 8, 2019, and Genentech moved in district court for a
temporary restraining order to prevent launch on the grounds that the
aBLA supplements triggered a requirement for a new notice of intent
to commercially market.178 The district court denied the motion, and
Genentech appealed.179
The Federal Circuit affirmed in an opinion by Judge Moore and
joined by Judges O’Malley and Hughes.180 The panel held that the
plain meaning of the statute “makes clear that the biosimilar applicant
must provide notice to the reference product sponsor prior to commercially marketing the biological product.”181 There was no evidence
that the product had changed, and thus, the court held that “Genentech
. . . had notice of Amgen’s intent to commercially market Mvasi as
required under Section 262(l)(8)(A) as early as October 6, 2017.”182
Genentech’s argument was that the phrase “licensed under subsection
(k)” in the statute is defined “by particular manufacturing facilities and
labeling” and that the supplements Amgen submitted involved adding
a manufacturing facility and amending the Mvasi label, and this constituted a distinct biological product that triggered a requirement for a
new notice.183 The panel recognized that Section 262(k), not Section
262(l)(8)(A), specifies the disclosure required for licensure, and that
Section 262(l)(8)(A), in contrast, involves timing of notice and marketing the biosimilar product.184
The opinion expressly relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sandoz v. Amgen185 that construed the licensing requirement Section
262(l)(8)(A) narrowly to merely mean that the biosimilar product must
have a license on the date of first commercial marketing.186 It could be
argued, of course, that in that case the word is surplusage because no
drug can be marketed without FDA approval. But the Court had been
clear that “Section 262(l)(8)(A)’s notice requirement is separate from
Section 262(k)’s licensure requirements,” and the Federal Circuit’s
opinion applied the law in the same way here, stating “[a] biosimilar
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 1110–11.
Id. at 1111.
Id.
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1111.
Id.
Id. (citing Brief for Appellant at 15–18).
Id. at 1111–12.
137 S. Ct. 1664, 1677 (2017).
Id.
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applicant that has already provided Section 262(l)(8)(A) notice regarding its biological product need not provide another notice for each supplemental application concerning the same biological product.”187
There has been discussion elsewhere regarding the unconventionality (if not the potential procedural impropriety) of the Federal Circuit
hearing the appeal on denial of a motion for a temporary restraining
order (this being the first time the court has done so),188 especially in
view of precedent where the court denied such relief, such as Nikken
USA, Inc. v. Robinson-May, Inc.189 While that decision was consistent
with Supreme Court precedent,190 (and arguably this one is not), the
Nikken decision was nonprecedential. Under such circumstances, it is
unlikely that policy concerns did not play a role. After all, the decision
was consistent with facilitating an early appearance of Amgen’s Mvasi
biosimilar on the market to reduce public drug costs, which has been
the policy goal and justification for the biosimilar licensing provisions
of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (“BPCIA”)
since its inception. An argument could be made that refusing to take
the appeal would have led to the same result, but by speaking to the
issue, the Court made it less likely that any such attempts to delay
marketing would occur for other biosimilars in the future. That outcome, in itself, might be sufficient justification for the Court to resolve
this issue here.
E. Eagle Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Slayback Pharma LLC 191
Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents (as a basis of a
successful cause of action having renewed vigor before the Federal
Circuit)192 is most frequently rebutted by the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel.193 This is not the only defense available to an accused
187. Genentech, 964 F.3d at 1112.
188. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Biosimilars and Temporary Restraining Orders,
PATENTLY-O (July 6, 2020), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/07/biosimilars-temporary-restraining.html [https://perma.cc/T4BT-N7X2].
189. 217 F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
190. See Off. of Pers. Mgmt. v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 473 U.S. 1301, 1306
(1985).
191. 958 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
192. See, e.g., Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, 806 Fed. App’x 1007
(Fed. Cir. 2020); Kevin E. Noonan, Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC (Fed. Cir. 2020), PAT. DOCS (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.patentdocs.org/2020/03/galderma-laboratories-lp-v-amneal-pharmaceuticals-llc-fed-cir2020.html [https://perma.cc/U3DR-F32H].
193. E.g., Pharma Tech Sols., Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc., 942 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2019).
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infringer; its sister doctrine of dedication-disclosure can be equally effective under circumstances where a patentee has disclaimed aspects
or embodiments that could fall within the scope of equivalents but was
disclaimed to avoid prior art, for lack of utility, or insufficiency of
disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112.194 The Federal Circuit applied the
dedication-disclosure doctrine to affirm the district court’s dismissal
on the pleadings of plaintiff Eagle Pharmaceuticals’ infringement allegations under the doctrine of equivalents in Eagle Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Slayback Pharma LLC.195
The case arose in ANDA litigation over Eagle’s bendamustine
formulation (“BELRAPZO”).196 Eagle asserted U.S. Patent Nos.
9,265,831; 9,572,796; 9,572,797; and 10,010,533 in the litigation;
claim 1 of the ’796 patent was considered representative by the parties
and hence the court:
A non-aqueous liquid composition comprising:
bendamustine, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof;
a pharmaceutically acceptable fluid comprising a mixture
of polyethylene glycol and propylene glycol, wherein the
ratio of poly- ethylene glycol to propylene glycol in the
pharmaceutically acceptable fluid is from about 95:5 to
about 50:50; and
a stabilizing amount of an antioxidant;
wherein the composition has less than about 5% total impurities after 15 months of storage at about 5° C., as calculated on a normalized peak area response basis as determined by high performance liquid chromatography at a
wavelength of 223 nm.197
The emphasized limitation was the basis of the dispute, Slayback conceding that in all other respects its competing generic formulation literally infringed Eagle’s claims.198 Eagle contended in its complaint
that that term was infringed under the doctrine of equivalents, wherein
the ethanol used in Slayback’s product was equivalent to Eagle’s polyethylene glycol.199 Slayback countered with a motion under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(c) that the dedication-disclosure doctrine
194. See Reckitt Benckiser Pharms. Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Lab’ys S.A., No. 14-1451
-RGA, 2017 WL 3782782, at *5–6 (D. Del. Aug. 31, 2017).
195. 958 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
196. Eagle Pharms. Inc. v. Slayback Pharma LLC, 958 F.3d 1171, 1173 (Fed. Cir.
2020).
197. U.S. Patent No. 9,572,796 col. 13 ll. 22–35 (filed Feb. 21, 2017) (emphasis
added).
198. Eagle Pharms., Inc., 958 F.3d at 1173.
199. Id. at 1173–74.
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barred Eagle from prevailing on its doctrine of equivalents allegation
because the ’796 specification (and the specifications of all the other
asserted patents) disclosed but did not claim ethanol-containing embodiments.200
Set forth in the Federal Circuit’s opinion, as relied upon by the
district court, are almost a half dozen citations to the specification reciting ethanol as a “pharmaceutically acceptable fluid” used in the
claimed formulation (including ones where ethanol is a dreaded “preferred” embodiment).201 Eagle countered by asserting that ethanol was
properly a component of the claimed invention only in the presence of
chloride salts (which were not claimed) and not in the claimed embodiments comprising an antioxidant.202 Eagle supported its assertions
with a declaration from an expert witness that the skilled worker would
appreciate this distinction and understand that patentee had not disclaimed ethanol-comprising embodiments, properly formulated; there
was no rebuttal of this testimony by Slayback.203 Refusing to consider
the expert’s testimony (and opining that Eagle was attempting to
“manufacture a factual dispute”), the district court held for Slayback
and granted its motion to dismiss as a matter of law; this appeal followed.204
The Federal Circuit affirmed in an opinion by Judge Reyna and
joined by Judges O’Malley and Chen. The opinion sets out the relationship between the doctrine of equivalents205 as defined by the Supreme Court in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.,206 and Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical
Co.,207 and its limitation by the disclosure-dedication doctrine in Johnson & Johnston Associates v. R.E. Service Co., Inc.208 The equitable
principle of the doctrine recognized by the Court is that it “reinforces
‘the primacy of the claims in defining the scope of the patentee’s exclusive right.’”209 To properly apply the doctrine, the specification
must “disclose[] unclaimed subject matter with ‘such specificity that
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
1054).

Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1173–74, 1176–77.
Id. at 1174.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1175.
339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997).
285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc).
Eagle Pharms., 958 F.3d at 1175 (quoting Johnson & Johnson, 285 F.3d at
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one of ordinary skill in the art could identify the subject matter that
had been disclosed and not claimed.’”210
The panel appreciated Eagle’s challenge to be procedural, regarding whether the district court properly dismissed its complaint on the
pleadings, as well as on the merits of whether the plaintiff had disclaimed ethanol-comprising embodiments by disclosing but not claiming them.211 The Court recognized that Eagle claimed it disclosed its
bendamustine formulations in three alternatives: “(i) chloride salt formulations; (ii) antioxidant formulations; and (iii) dimethyl sulfoxide
(“DMSO”) formulations,” and that ethanol was an alternative only in
the “unclaimed chloride salt formulations.”212 According to Eagle, the
skilled worker would appreciate that distinction and that it had not disclaimed ethanol as an equivalent to polyethylene glycol in other formulations.213 As pithily put in the opinion, the Court “disagreed.”214
Citing Johnson, the opinion asserts that “[t]he disclosure-dedication doctrine does not require the specification to disclose the allegedly dedicated subject matter in an embodiment that exactly matches
the claimed embodiment”;215 indeed, according to the opinion, the patentee made arguments (unsuccessfully) in that case similar to Eagle’s
arguments here.216 The court resolves the issue of whether the disclosure-dedication doctrine applies “only [where] the specification disclose[s] the unclaimed matter ‘as an alternative to the relevant claim
limitation.’”217 The panel found no qualifications in the specification
as now asserted by Eagle regarding limitations to where ethanol is or
is not an alternative to polyethylene glycol. The Court was “not persuaded” that the facts here track those in Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (where the Court deigned not to apply the doctrine)
on the grounds that in Pfizer, the limitation in dispute concerned a
unique, specific purpose (“a suitable amount of a saccharide to inhibit
hydrolysis”) whereas, in this case, the alternatives all have only one
purpose (i.e., to be “pharmaceutically acceptable”).218
210. Id. (quoting PSC Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 335 F.3d 1353,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
211. Id. at 1173–76.
212. Id. at 1176 (emphasis in opinion).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. (citing Johnson & Johnson, 285 F.3d at 1052).
216. Id. at 1176.
217. Id. (citing Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)).
218. Id. at 1176–77.
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Turning to Eagle’s procedural objections, the opinion sets these
forth as (1) there was a factual dispute that precluded judgment; (2)
the district court did not draw all inferences in non-movant Eagle’s
favor; and (3) the district court did not consider its proffered expert’s
testimony.219 In rejecting these contentions, the opinion notes that considering evidence (like Eagle’s experts) outside the pleadings is within
the district court’s discretion (and by doing so, converts the motion to
be one for summary judgment).220 The standard of review is thus an
abuse of discretion, and the panel found no such abuse in relying on
the disclosure in the asserted patents themselves.221 Nor was there any
error in deciding the issue as a matter of law, and the opinion states
that “[e]xpert testimony is not always required for a district court to
determine how a skilled artisan would understand a patent’s disclosure
and claimed invention.”222 Finding these and all of the other Eagle arguments unpersuasive, the Federal Circuit affirmed.223
F. Immunex Corp. v. Sandoz Inc.224
The Federal Circuit held in Immunex Corp. v. Sandoz Inc. that the
“all substantive rights” test, used heretofore to determine the identity
of the “patentee” for purposes of satisfying 35 U.S.C. § 281, should
be the standard for determining common ownership in applying the
judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting
(“ODP”).225 This decision may serve to complicate the legal landscape
for patent licensees when addressing a common ownership question.
As in the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
decision,226 ultimately contract law, not patent law, provides the basis
for the court’s decision in this case.
The case arose in litigation under the BPCIA, relevant provisions
codified under 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)) over Sandoz’ biosimilar application
for its product Erelzi, a generic form of Enbrel (“etanercept”), which
219. Id. at 1177–78.
220. Id. at 1177 (citing Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1992);
and Arthur R. Miller et al., § 1371 Conversion of Rule 12(c) Motion Into Summary
Judgment Motion, in FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller eds., 3d ed. 2020)).
221. Id.
222. Id. (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Am. Can Co., 724 F.2d 1567, 1573 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); and Amgen Inc. v. Coherus BioSciences Inc., 931 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed.
Cir. 2019)).
223. Id. at 1178.
224. 964 F.3d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
225. Id. at 1057–59.
226. See 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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reduces the signs and symptoms of moderately to severely active rheumatoid arthritis.227 Etanercept is a fusion protein “made by combining
a portion of a 75 kilodalton (‘kDa’) human tumor necrosis factor receptor protein [the extracellular portion] with a portion of immunoglobulin G1 (‘IgG1’),” specifically, the portion including the hinge region, CH2, and CH3 domains.228 Immunex is the exclusive licensee of
Hoffmann-La Roche for U.S. Patent Nos. 8,063,182 (to the etanercept
composition of matter) and 8,163,522 (methods for making etanercept).229
Immunex received FDA approval for Enbrel and entered into a
royalty-bearing license agreement with Roche for patents and applications that contained claims relevant to this product (including the ’182
and ’522 patents).230 Amgen later acquired Immunex and entered into
an “Accord and Satisfaction” agreement (the “Agreement”) with
Roche, the purpose of which was “to eliminate the continuing obligations to pay royalties to Roche.”231 The terms of this agreement gave
Immunex a “paid-up, irrevocable, exclusive license to the U.S. patent
family for the patents-in-suit.”232 Relevant to the Federal Circuit’s decision, the Agreement gave Immunex “the sole right to grant sublicenses, to make, have made, use, sell, offer for sale and import products covered by the patent family” and “the exclusive right to
prosecute patent applications in the U.S. patent family.”233 Immunex
also received the right to enforce the patents in the first instance, and
Roche reserving the right to sue (and retain all damages received) upon
Immunex’s notice that it would not bring suit.234 Also, Roche can
practice the claimed invention only for internal, research purposes under the terms of the Agreement.235
Sandoz stipulated to infringement, and a trial was held on patent
validity.236 The district court held that Sandoz had not established by
clear and convincing evidence that the claims were invalid for obviousness, failure to satisfy the written description requirement, or obviousness-type double patenting.237 With regard to the OPD issue, the
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Immunex Corp., 964 F.3d at 1053.
Id. at 1053–54.
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1055.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1055–56.
Id. at 1056.
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district court set forth the following reasons why Sandoz’ arguments
were not persuasive:
(1) that Sandoz’s proposed test for common-ownership does
not apply; (2) even if that test applies, the patents-in-suit and
the asserted double-patenting reference patents are not commonly owned; (3) even if they are commonly owned, the
two-way, rather than the one-way test for obviousness-type
double patenting applies as to some of the double-patenting
references; and (4) the patents-in-suit are patentably distinct
from each of the asserted double patenting references.238
Sandoz appealed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed in an opinion by Judge O’Malley
and joined by Judge Chen; Judge Reyna filed a dissenting opinion directed to the ODP issue.239 The opinion characterized Sandoz’ common ownership argument as “novel,” in that although Roche owns the
patents-in-suit, Immunex “effectively” owns them under the Accord
& Satisfaction agreement.240 This amounted to an application of the
“all substantial rights” test to determine standing to sue under 35
U.S.C. § 281. The majority agreed that this test can be “informative”
in determining common ownership, but Sandoz has not done so here
because “the agreement at issue here did not transfer all substantial
rights from the assignee, Roche, to the exclusive licensee, Immunex.”241
Further, “[u]nder Sandoz’s theory of common ownership, if a
party is the effective patentee for purposes of the ability to bring an
infringement suit, then it is also an effective patentee for purposes of
obviousness-type double patenting” according to Sandoz, and if the
rule was contrary, an assignment can be turned into a license.242 In
particular, “if a party acquires all substantial rights in a patent application, including the right to control prosecution, then obviousnesstype double patenting should apply to prohibit issuance of claims that
are not patentably distinct from claims in patents already owned by
that party.”243
The majority expressly rejected Immunex’s position that common
ownership arises only when “the relevant inventions were owned by

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 1056–57.
Id. at 1052, 1068.
Id. at 1057.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the same entity at the time of the invention.”244 The majority further
rejected Immunex’s historical argument that revisions to the patent
statute in 1984 created a “gap” that ODP was intended to fill to prevent
two patents arising on obvious variants of a patented invention.245
The Federal Circuit agreed with Sandoz that the interpretation
that the “all substantial rights” test was an appropriate measure for
common ownership and was more consistent with the purpose of the
ODP doctrine but refused to “import into this judicially-created doctrine the entirety of our body of law analyzing who is a statutory ‘patentee’ pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 281,”246 making the distinction: “We
conclude only that where one of the rights transferred is the right to
prosecute the patent at issue, identification of the effective ‘patentee’
is informative in evaluating whether the patents are ‘commonly
owned’ for purposes of obviousness-type double patenting.”247
Here, the Accord and Satisfaction agreement did not satisfy this
test, according to the panel majority.248 While there are many factors
that can be assessed for this determination, the panel focused on two:
“enforcement and alienation” and “the scope of the licensee’s right to
sublicense, the nature of license provisions regarding reversion of
rights, the duration of the license grant, and the nature of any limits on
the licensee’s right to assign its interests in the patent.”249 Under Delaware law, the majority applied the de novo standard of review regarding interpreting the district court’s construction of the terms of the
contract and clear error for parol evidence of the parties’ intent (although in view of the express terms of the agreement the Federal Circuit found no need to resort to parol evidence).250
With regard to the parties’ intent, the district court found, and the
Federal Circuit agreed, that the parties “specifically intended for the
Accord & Satisfaction to be a license such that Roche would remain
the owner of the patents-in-suit.”251 This determination was supported
244. Id. (citing MPEP § 804.03(II) for its analysis of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(2)(C) or
pre-AIA 35 § U.S.C. 103(c)(1)).
245. Id. (citing In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 893 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that the
Court rejected this interpretation in Geneva Pharms., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC,
349 F.3d 1373, 1377, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2003), as has the PTO in Ex parte Maurice,
No. 2005-2463, 2005 WL 4779419, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 19, 2005)).
246. Id. at 1059.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1059–60 (citing Alfred E. Mann Found. v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d
1354, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
250. Id. at 1060.
251. Id. (quoting the district court’s decision in Immunex Corp. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
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in the district court by the express language of the agreement (wherein
it was termed a “license”) as well as testimony from an Amgen witness.252 This portion of the district court’s opinion came in for criticism by the panel opinion, the majority stating that “we have clarified
that ‘whether a transfer of a particular right or interest under a patent
is an assignment or a license does not depend upon the name by which
it calls itself, but upon the legal effect of its provisions.’”253
But the panel opinion is intentionally parsimonious in instructing
that rather than “import[ing] into [the] judicially-created doctrine [of
obviousness-type double patenting] the entirety of our body of law analyzing who is a statutory ‘patentee’ pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 281,”
setting forth the principle that “only that where one of the rights transferred is the right to prosecute the patent at issue, identification of the
effective ‘patentee’ is informative in evaluating whether the patents
are ‘commonly owned’ for purposes of obviousness-type double patenting.”254 The panel opinion held that the party having the right to
control prosecution satisfies the “all substantial rules” test and, as a
result, “prevent[s] the unjustifiable issuance of claims that are patentably indistinct from claims already owned by that party.”255 Perhaps
most importantly, “looking to the ‘all substantial rights’ test achieves
the proper balance between deterring gamesmanship in prosecution,
on the one hand, and avoiding any chilling effect on routine collaborations and licensing between parties working in the same field of research, on the other.”256
Applying these principles to this case, the panel majority held that
Roche had not transferred all substantial rights to Immunex, and thus,
the parties did not commonly own the patents because the license was
not substantially an assignment as Sandoz had argued.257 Considering
the enforcement and alienation provisions of the agreement, the Federal Circuit majority held that it is “clear” that Roche did not transfer
all its substantive rights in the patents.258 For the panel majority, retention by Roche of the “secondary” right to sue for infringement was

395 F. Supp. 3d 366, 415 (D.N.J. 2019)).
252. Id.
253. Id. (quoting Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925
F.3d 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).
254. Id. at 1059.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1061–63.
258. Id. at 1061.
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dispositive, saying it was “thoroughly inconsistent” with a conclusion
that the license was effectively an assignment.259
The opinion expressly distinguished the Court’s earlier decision
in Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc.260 because there the licensee could
frustrate the licensor’s secondary right to sue by offering putative infringers a license, whereas here, Immunex could not do so once
Roche’s secondary right has been triggered by Immunex’s decision
not to bring suit.261
The panel also considered Roche retaining the right to veto any
assignment by Immunex to a third party to be inconsistent with transfer of all substantial rights in the license.262 The majority also affirmed
the district court’s decision that Sandoz had not established by clear
and convincing evidence that the claims were invalid for obviousness
or failure to satisfy the written description requirement (Judge Reyna
did not dissent from this part of the opinion).263 Regarding written description, the panel affirmed the district court’s decision that the existence of the full-length p75 amino acid sequence in the prior art adequately supported claims directed to a fusion protein between fulllength p75 and the Fc portion of IgG, even though the specification
only disclosed such a fusion protein comprising a truncated p75 sequence, on the grounds that “[i]t is well-established that a patent specification need not re-describe known prior art concepts.”264 In addition, the panel credited the district court’s reliance on expert witness
testimony, wherein the lower court was due deference under the clear
error standard of review.265
Regarding obviousness, the panel found unpersuasive Sandoz’s
arguments regarding motivation to combine and secondary indicia.266
The panel found Sandoz’s arguments at trial and in post-trial motions
regarding the relationship between motivation to combine and use of
etanercept for treating inflammatory disorders contradicted its position.267 For the relevant objective indicia (clinical success, long-felt
need, and failure of others) the panel held that the district court had
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1062.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1063.
264. Id. at 1063–64 (citing Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2005)) (these sequences were also available to the public from deposited materials).
265. Id. at 1065.
266. Id. at 1065–66.
267. Id.
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properly concluded that Immunex had demonstrated the required
nexus between the claims and the etanercept product.268 As stated in
the opinion, “Sandoz’s arguments regarding objective indicia are
merely disagreements with the district court’s weighing of the evidence,” which is not clear error.269
Judge Reyna’s dissent on the ODP question amounted to his disagreement with the majority’s application of the “all substantial
rights” standard to the Accord and Satisfaction agreement between the
parties; he discerned “gamesmanship” in the course of prosecuting the
patents-in-suit.270 On substantive law, Judge Reyna also opined that
panel should have applied the “one-way” test for obviousness-type
double patenting to this situation.271 His reasoning was that because
the district court found that both the Patent Office and Roche were
responsible for the delay in prosecution leading to the later-filed application granting first as a patent, the situation did not satisfy the requirement for applying the two-way test that the Patent Office be
solely responsible for the delay.272
G. Genentech, Inc. v. Hospira, Inc.273
The Federal Circuit affirmed invalidation of claims to methods
for reducing Protein A leaching in affinity column chromatographic
methods important inter alia in purifying monoclonal antibodies, in
Genentech, Inc. v. Hospira, Inc.274 By doing so, the panel majority
(over a dissent by Judge Newman) illustrated anew the importance of
the deference the United States Patent and Trademark Office (and particularly the Patent Trial and Appeal Board) is due under the Administrative Procedures Act and how that deference can be outcome determinative under the right circumstances.275
The case arose before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(“Board”) in an inter partes review (“IPR”) of U.S. Patent No.
7,807,799 (the “’799 patent”), which claimed methods for purifying
antibodies comprising a CH2/CH3 region using Protein A affinity chromatography.276 The claimed methods are directed to an improvement
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 1067–68.
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1068–69 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1071–72.
Id.
946 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1335, 1343.
Id. at 1335–36.
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wherein the amount of Protein A contaminant in the antibody eluate is
minimized (substantially to zero).277 The opinion characterized the
claimed method as a “standard purification technique,” relying on high
affinity and reversible binding to CH2/CH3 regions, which was capable
of “reducing leaching of protein A . . . by reducing [the] temperature”
of the “composition that is subjected to protein A affinity chromatography.”278 The inventors found that performing chromatography at
temperatures between 10–18°C (the specification also disclosing a
broader range of 3–20°C) can minimize leaching.279 Claim 1 of the
’799 patent is representative: “A method of purifying a protein which
comprises CH2/CH3 region, comprising subjecting a composition
comprising said protein to protein A affinity chromatography at a temperature in the range from about 10°C to about 18°C.”280
The primary references asserted by Hospira in its IPR were International Publication No. WO 95/22389 and a scientific reference contributed by van Sommeren and colleagues to a treatise entitled Effects
of Temperature, Flow Rate and Composition of Binding Buffer on Adsorption of Mouse Monoclonal IgG1 Antibodies to Protein A Sepharose 4 Fast Flow,281 as well as other secondary references that
Hospira applied in combination with the ’389 PCT publication for the
Board’s obviousness determinations.282 The ’389 PCT publication disclosed Protein A purification of antibodies performed at room temperature, defined as 18–25°C, which overlapped with the ’799’s temperature range of about 10°C to about 18°C.283 The Board held that all
claims in the IPR (1–3 and 5–11) can be anticipated by the ’389 PCT
publication, or obvious in light of the ’389 PCT publication or the van
Sommeren reference as a primary reference in combination with other
secondary references.284 Genentech appealed and also challenged the
constitutionality of applying IPRs retroactively in view of the ’799 patents priority date; the federal government intervened to address this
issue on appeal.285
277. Id. at 1336.
278. Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 7,807,799 col. 18 ll. 47–51 (filed Nov. 12,
2008)).
279. Id. (quoting ’799 Patent at col. 18 ll. 4–9).
280. Id. (quoting ’799 Patent at col. 35 ll. 44–47).
281. A.P.G. van Sommeren, Effects of Temperature, Flow Rate and Composition
of Binding Buffer on Adsorption of Mouse Monoclonal IgG1 Antibodies to Protein
a Sepharose 4 Fast Flow, 22 PREPARATIVE BIOCHEMISTRY 135 (1992).
282. Genentech, 946 F.3d at 1336–37.
283. Id. at 1337–38.
284. Id. at 1342–43.
285. Id. at 1343.
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The Federal Circuit affirmed in an opinion by Judge Chen and
joined by Chief Judge Prost; Judge Newman dissented.286 Regarding
the Board’s anticipation decision, the Federal Circuit relied on the
overlap of the temperature ranges on the basis that the method disclosed in the ’389 PCT publication was directed to purifying antibodies comprising the CH2/CH3 region and included a Protein A purification step performed at room temperature, defined in the
specification as the range of 18–25°C.287 The Federal Circuit’s opinion states that “[a] prior art reference that discloses an overlapping but
different range than the claimed range can be anticipatory, even where
the prior art range only partially or slightly overlaps with the claimed
range.”288 The question that a court must answer, according to the
opinion, is “whether the patentee has established that the claimed
range is critical to the operability of the claimed invention.”289 The
Board found that Genentech had not carried this burden, and (curiously, perhaps) Genentech did not challenge this finding on appeal.290
The Board also found that the ’389 PCT publication taught that
Protein A column chromatography was performed throughout at room
temperature (18–25°C, i.e., the overlapping temperature range).291
Genentech attempted to challenge this interpretation on the ground
that “room temperature” as disclosed in the ’389 PCT publication was
precisely that, the temperature of the room in which the chromatography was performed and not the temperature of the components, buffers, etc. used in the purification.292 Genentech based this argument in
part on the temperature of the source material to be subjected to chromatography (i.e., antibody preparations from cells cultured at 37°C)
in the absence of instructions in the ’389 PCT publication to cool this
material to “room temperature” and relied on testimony from its expert.293 Hospira’s expert, on the contrary, argued that those of skill in
the art would perform chromatography at “ambient” (room) temperature.294 The Federal Circuit majority held that “substantial evidence
supports the Board’s finding that the HCCF subject to Protein A
286. Id. at 1335, 1343.
287. Id. at 1339–40.
288. Id. at 1338 (citing Ineos USA LLC v. Berry Plastics Corp., 783 F.3d 865,
870–71 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
289. Id. (citing Ineous, 783 F.3d at 871; E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina
C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
290. Genentech, 946 F.3d at 1338.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1338–40.
293. Id. at 1339.
294. Id.
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affinity chromatography in WO ’389 is within the claimed temperature range of claim 1.”295 The majority identified portions of Genentech’s expert’s testimony that it disagreed with (correctly, in the majority’s view) and held that “to the extent the experts disagreed with
one another, the Board reasonably chose to credit the testimony of
[Hospira’s expert] over the testimony of [Genentech’s expert],”296 another instance where the deference the court is mandated to give fact
questions to the Board under Dickinson v. Zurko,297 was dispositive.
The Federal Circuit majority also rejected Genentech’s argument that
the Board’s decision was contrary to the court’s precedent (thus converting the issue to a question on law) and affirmed the Board’s determination that Genentech’s claims were invalid for anticipation by the
disclosure in the ’389 PCT publication.298
Turning to the Board’s decision that the claims were also obvious
due to the combination of the disclosure of the ’389 PCT publication
and a variety of other prior art references, the panel majority relied on
their precedent that “[i]f the relevant comparison between a disputed
claim limitation and the prior art pertains to a range of overlapping
values, ‘we and our predecessor court have consistently held that even
a slight overlap in range establishes a prima facie case of obviousness.’”299 This has the effect of raising a presumption of obviousness,
according to the opinion, thus shifting the burden on the patentee to
rebut the presumption (which the Board held Genentech did not do,
and the panel majority affirmed).300 Genentech neither showed that the
temperature range was critical to the invention nor that the prior art
did not recognize temperature as being “result-effective” (two ways to
achieve the required rebuttal).301 This latter stratagem was ineffective
in the Board’s view because the prior art understood Protein A leaching to be the result of proteolysis, and that temperature affected proteolysis.302 Moreover, according to the court, “[t]he Board reasonably
found that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to optimize the
temperature given the teachings of the prior art, and that given the ease
with which temperature can be varied, finding an optimal temperature
range would have been nothing more than routine
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id.
Id. at 1340.
527 U.S. 150 (1999).
Genentech, 946 F.3d at 1340.
Id. at 1341 (quoting In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
Id.
Id. at 1341–42.
Id. at 1341.
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experimentation.”303 The panel majority rejected Genentech’s argument that the purported desire to reduce Protein A leaching was relevant only in large-scale, industrial applications of the technique, not at
least because Genentech’s claim was not limited to these circumstances.304
Finally, the Board held that the objective indicia of nonobviousness did not change their conclusion that Genentech’s claims were obvious, and the panel majority affirmed this determination.305
The majority’s opinion closes with the court’s rejection of Genentech’s challenge that inter partes reviews are an unconstitutional violation of the Fifth Amendment (for reasons substantially identical to
the court’s earlier opinion in Celgene Corp. v. Peter),306 the Seventh
Amendment, or Article III.307
Judge Newman dissented on the basis inter alia that the invention
had actually solved a real-world problem and that the majority’s affirmance ignored the value the invention brought to the art:
The court presents a hindsight determination that this apparently simple solution to a difficult problem is anticipated and
obvious, although it was not known or obvious to the scientists who were attempting to solve the problem of leaching
contamination, and the experts for both sides agreed that the
solution presented in the ’799 patent was new to them.308
She saw the complexities involved in arriving at this solution and the
failure in the art to disclose the solution rebuts in the Board’s invalidation on anticipation and obviousness grounds.309 On the merits,
Judge Newman discounted the overlap at 18°C as supporting anticipation because her understanding of the law would require the temperature range disclosed in the ’389 PCT publication (18–25°C) to be the
same as the claimed temperature range (10–18°C).310 And Judge Newman rejected the “optimization” basis for the Board’s obviousness determination (and the majority’s affirmance), stating that:
[T]he question is not whether it would have been easy to cool
the material to the 10°C - 18°C range; the question is whether
it would have been obvious to do so. Contrary to the Board’s
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id. at 1341–42.
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1342–43.
931 F.3d 1342, 1356–63 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Genentech, 946 F.3d at 1343.
Id. at 1343 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1343–44.
Id. at 1345–46.
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and the court’s view, this is not a matter of optimizing a
known procedure to obtain a known result; for it was not
known that cooling the material for chromatography would
avoid contamination of the purified protein with leached protein A.311
H. Genentech, Inc. v. Iancu 312
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s
(“Board”) claim construction (and IPR decision invalidating claims
for obviousness) in its Genentech, Inc. v. Iancu decision and also had
the occasion to review and affirm the Board’s procedure-based denial
of patent owner Genentech’s motion to amend when petitioner requested the Board to enter adverse judgment on one ground of the IPR
institution.313 The IPR involved U.S. Patent No. 7,846,441 (claims 1–
14) and U.S. Patent No. 7,892,549 (claims 1–17) and was brought (in
separate petitions consolidated after institution) by Hospira, Samsung
Bioepsis, Celltrion, and Pfizer.314 The patents pertained to methods for
treating disorders characterized by overexpression of Her2 (encoded
by the erbB2 gene), which include breast cancer, by administering an
anti-ErbB2 antibody (such as Herceptin) and a taxoid in the absence
of an anthracycline derivative (in the ’441 patent claims) or in the presence of “a further growth inhibitory agent” or “a further therapeutic
agent.”315 Claim 1 of the ’441 patent and claims 1 and 5 of the ’549
patent are representative:
The ’441 patent:
1. A method for the treatment of a human patient with a malignant progressing tumor or cancer characterized by overexpression of ErbB2 receptor, comprising administering a combination of an in-tact antibody which binds to epitope 4D5
within the ErbB2 extracellular domain sequence and a taxoid, in the absence of an anthracycline derivative, to the human patient in an amount effective to extend the time to disease progression in said human patient, without increase in
overall severe adverse events.316
311. Id. at 1347.
312. 809 Fed. App’x 781 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
313. Id. at 782.
314. Id. at 782 n.1.
315. Id. at 782–83 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 7,892,549, col. 33 ll. 38–45, 54–59
(filed Feb. 3, 2003)).
316. Id. at 783 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 7,846,441, col. 33 ll. 46–54 (filed Dec.
12, 1998)) (emphasis added by the court, where the italicized limitations were relevant to the Board’s decision).
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The ’549 patent:
1. A method for the treatment of a human patient with breast
cancer that overexpresses ErbB2 receptor, comprising administering a combination of an antibody that binds ErbB2,
a taxoid, and a further growth inhibitory agent to the human
patient in an amount effective to extend the time to disease
progression in the human patient, wherein the antibody
binds to epitope 4D5 within the ErbB2 extracellular domain
sequence.
5. A method for the treatment of a human patient with breast
cancer characterized by overexpression of ErbB2 receptor,
comprising administering an effective amount of a combination of an anti-ErbB2 antibody which binds epitope 4D5
within the ErbB2 extracellular domain sequence, a taxoid,
and a further therapeutic agent, to the human patient.317
The Board rendered final written decisions finding all claims in these
patents to be obvious.318 The Board based its decision on its construction of the phrases “an amount effective to extend the time to disease
progression in the human patient” and “an effective amount” to be in
the context of situations where there is no treatment.319
The Federal Circuit affirmed in an opinion by Judge Moore and
joined by Judges Lourie and Wallach. The Federal Circuit noted that
Genentech did not challenge the Board’s obviousness determination,
just the claim construction upon which the Board based its determination.320 The panel reviewed the Board’s claim construction de novo
under Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,321 and focused on the
prosecution history in its analysis because neither the claim language
nor the specification “clearly define[d]” the terms at issue before the
court.322 The examiner rejected the term “extend the time to disease
progression” as being indefinite without the specification providing “a
standard for ascertaining the requisite degree,” wherein “one of ordinary skill would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention.”323 The opinion sets forth the “give and take” between the examiner and applicant on this issue:

317. Id. (quoting ’549 Patent col. 33 ll. 38-45, 54-59) (emphasis added by the
court, where the italicized limitations were relevant to the Board’s decision)).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 782.
320. Id. at 782, 784.
321. 574 U.S. 318, 331–332 (2015).
322. Genentech, 809 F. App’x at 783–84.
323. Id. at 784.
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The Examiner:
Specifically, it is never set forth what the extension of time
to disease progress is relative to, for example, is the extension of time to disease progress relative to untreated patients?
Patients who received antibody or taxoid alone? Patients who
received antibody and an anthracycline?324
Applicant’s response:
[T]he expressions ‘extend the time to disease progression’
and ‘response rate’ are clear from the specification (see, in
particular, page 15, lines 15–17; and pages 42–43) and would
be readily under-stood by a skilled oncologist. Clearly, the
combination of an anti-ErbB2 antibody and a taxoid is administered in an amount effective to extend the time to disease progression relative to an untreated patient.325
The Board considered Genentech to have made an “express choice” in
making this response and that the examiner allowed the claims of the
’441 patent based on this response.326 The Federal Circuit agreed with
the Board’s apprehension in this regard, saying that Genentech had
“provided an unequivocal, direct response to the examiner’s inquiry—
that the term ‘extend the time to disease progression’ was compared
to an untreated patient.”327 The construction Genentech advocated before the Board and on appeal was one the examiner suggested and that
Genentech rejected, according to the opinion.328
On these facts, the panel found no error in how the Board had
construed the claims.329 Specifically, the panel held that “[t]he Board’s
construction of the term ‘extend the time to disease progression’ as
requiring comparison to an untreated patient is consistent with the
claims, specifications, and prosecution histories of the ’441 and ’549
patents.”330
The Federal Circuit also upheld the Board’s decision not to grant
Genentech’s motion to amend based on failure to show good cause.
The Board rejected Genentech’s argument that it had a statutory right
to amend under section 316(d)(1) and based its “good cause” requirement on 37 C.F.R. section 42.121(c).331 In addition, because petitioner
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. (quoting No. 19-1263, J.A. 2051).
Id. (quoting No. 19-1263, J.A. 2082).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 784.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 784.
Id. at 785–86.
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had requested an adverse judgment on one of the grounds for institution under 37 C.F.R. section 42.73(b), the Board held (and the Federal
Circuit agreed) the issue was mooted.332 And the court responded to
Genentech’s argument that the rules do not permit “partial” adverse
judgment by relying on 37 C.F.R. section 42.5(b), which gives the
Board discretion to “waive or suspend a requirement of part[] . . .
42.”333 The Board’s use of this discretion was consistent with the Supreme Court’s statement in SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu334 that “Congress chose to structure a process in which it’s the petitioner, not the
Director, who gets to define the contours of the proceeding.”335 The
significance of these procedural issues was that Genentech had submitted a motion to amend the remaining IPR ground, and in the absence of any showing of prejudice, (that the opinion states Genentech
had not shown) the Board was within its discretion to require a showing of good cause and, in its absence, to deny a further motion to
amend.336 And, on appeal, Genentech was unable to satisfy the stringent requirement of establishing an abuse of discretion by the
Board.337
I. XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, LC338
The Federal Circuit took the opportunity presented in an appeal
from judgment on the pleadings in XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics,
LC to distinguish claims directed toward a patent-eligible invention
from invalidation under the Supreme Court’s imperfectly applied Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International339 test.
The case arose over XY’s assertion over Reissue Patent No.
RE46,559 as well as U.S. Patent Nos. 6,732,422; 7,723,116; and
8,652,769 against Trans Ova.340 The claims of the ’559 reissue patent
were directed to improving flow cytometric analysis.341 As set forth in
332. Id. at 786.
333. Id.
334. 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018).
335. Id.
336. Genentech, 809 Fed. App’x at 786.
337. Id. (“The Board abuses its discretion if the decision: (1) is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests
on clearly erroneous fact findings; or (4) involves a record that contains no evidence
on which the Board could rationally base its decision.” (quoting Ultratec, Inc. v.
CaptionCall, LLC, 872 F.3d 1267, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2017))).
338. 968 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
339. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
340. XY, LLC, 968 F.3d at 1326.
341. Id.
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the opinion, the claimed invention related to “apparatus and methods
for real-time discrimination of particles while being sorted by flow
cytometry . . . resulting in enhanced discrimination between populations of particles,” which could include cells, specifically sperm cells
based on whether the sperm carried an X or a Y chromosome.342 Useful applications included animal husbandry.343 The opinion contains
this illustration of the functional geometry of apparatuses encompassed by the asserted claims with the explanation that follows:

344

After passing through a laser beam (34), particles coupled to
a light-emitting element may emit signals, such as fluorescence, which are then collected by at least one signal detector, such as a forward scatter detector (30). The ‘signal detector may be connected to a system . . . in which signal data
indicative of the signals may be processed and analyzed in
order to determine a sort decision. While a sort decision is
being determined, particles may pass through a drop delay
(35).’ Following a sort decision, ‘a pulse of charge (37) may
be applied to a droplet (23) containing a particle. Droplets

342. Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. RE46,559, col. 1, ll. 26–31 (filed Feb. 21,
2017)).
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1327.
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may pass through charged deflection plates (38) in order to
sort particles into a desired sort receptacle (40).’345
The data produced in this way provides the basis for the apparatus to
produce a more discriminating assessment of particles in a mixture,
including differences between X- and Y-bearing sperm.346 These
methods involve signal processors programmed to detect differences
including “rotational alteration, translation operation, scaling operation, any combination of these and the like.”347
Claim 1 is representative:
1. A method of operating a flow cytometry apparatus with at
least n detectors to analyze at least two populations of particles in the same sample, the method comprising:
(a) establishing a fluid stream in the flow cytometry apparatus with at least n detectors, the at least n detectors including a first detector and a second detector;
(b) entraining particles from the sample in the fluid stream
in the flow cytometry apparatus;
(c) executing instructions read from a computer readable
memory with a processor, the processor being in communication with the first detector in the flow cytometer, to detect a first signal from the first detector based on individual
particles in the fluid stream;
(d) executing instructions read from the computer readable
memory with the processor, the processor being in communication with the second detector in the flow cytometer,
to detect a second signal from the second detector based on
the individual particles in the fluid stream;
(e) executing instructions read from the computer readable
memory with the processor to convert at least the first signal and the second signal into n-dimensional parameter
data for detected particles in the sample, wherein the n-dimensional parameter data for particles from the at least two
populations overlap in at least one of the dimensions;
(f) executing instructions read from the computer readable
memory with the processor to rotationally alter the n-dimensional parameter data so that spatial separation of the
data from the particles from the at least two populations in
the at least one dimension that is overlapped is increased;
(g) executing instructions read from the computer readable
memory with the processor to real-time classify each of the
individual detected particles into one of a first population
and a second population of the at least two populations
345. Id. (internal citations omitted).
346. Id.
347. Id. at 1328 (quoting ’559 Patent col. 5 ll. 41–49).
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based on at least the rotationally altered n-dimensional parameter data; and
(h) using the real-time classification, sorting the individual
particles with the flow cytometer.348
Trans Ova filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the
’559 reissue patent being invalid because the claims were not patenteligible under § 101.349 The district court granted this motion, applying
its understanding of the Supreme Court’s two-step analysis as set forth
in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.350 The Court held that the
claims concerned an abstract idea, specifically a “mathematical equation that permits rotating multi-dimensional data.”351 Under step two
of the Alice test, the district court held that there was no “inventive
concept” to render the claims patent eligible based on XY’s admission
that the prior art included all of the claim elements (albeit not in the
arrangement or order recited in the asserted claims).352 The district
court also granted Trans Ova’s motion to dismiss because the ’422,
’116, and ’769 patents was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion353 based on an earlier lawsuit.354
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court on its patent eligibility decision, vacated the judgment on claim preclusion, and remanded in an opinion by Judge Stoll, joined by Judges Plager and
Wallach.355 With regard to judgment and invalidation for patent ineligibility, the panel held that the district court had erred in its application
of the Alice test.356 Specifically, the Federal Circuit held that the asserted claims were not directed to an abstract idea; thus, if properly
applied, the Alice test would have mandated that the district court deny
Trans Ova’s motion.357 The panel considered the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on patent eligibility to include the principle that “[l]aws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable”358
to be tempered by the further Supreme Court instruction that “[a]t
348. Id. at 1328–29 (quoting ’559 Patent col. 16 l. 54–col. 17 l. 27).
349. Id. at 1329.
350. 573 U.S. 208 (2014); XY, LLC, 968 F.3d at 1329.
351. XY, LLC, 968 F.3d at 1330–31 (quoting XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics,
LC, 333 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1105 (D. Colo. 2018)).
352. Id. at 1329.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. XY, LLC, 968 F.3d at 1326.
356. Id. at 1330–31.
357. Id. at 1332.
358. Id. at 1330 (citing CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., 955 F.3d 1358, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2020)).
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some level, ‘all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply
laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,’”359 and that further “[t]hus, an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply
because it involves an abstract concept.”360
The district court’s error, according to the Federal Circuit, arose
in its application of step one of the Alice test because the asserted
claims did not recite an abstract concept in the court’s view.361 Even
Trans Ova’s counsel in argument before the Federal Circuit (according
to the opinion) admitted that the claims of the ’559 reissue patent were
“not merely directed” to the mathematical concept, but rather to:
[A] purportedly improved method of operating a flow cytometry apparatus to classify and sort particles into at least two
populations in real time, wherein first and second detectors
detect signals from individual particles and a processor converts the signals to n-dimensional parameter data and rotationally alters that data to increase spatial separation among
the data, thereby facilitating classification and sorting of
each individual particle.362
The opinion expressly relied on the Supreme Court’s Diehr opinion363
(as it must), as well as its own opinion in Thales Visionix Inc. v. United
States,364 for this conclusion.365 The court found the asserted claims of
the ’559 reissue patent to be analogous to the claims in Diehr because
“the asserted claims ‘describe in detail a step-by-step method’ for accomplishing a physical process.”366 The panel perceived a similar
analogy with the Thales claims, which recited methods “in which at
least two sensors or detectors gather data about an object before mathematical operations are applied to the gathered data to generate more
accurate information about the object than was previously possible in
the art.”367 And both sets of claims “purport to improve results” of
previously practiced methods.368 The panel appreciated the distinction
between a claim directed to a mathematical formula and claims that
359. Id. (citing Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (alteration in original)).
360. XY, LLC, 968 F.3d at 1330 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187
(1981)).
361. Id. at 1332.
362. Id. at 1330–31.
363. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
364. 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
365. XY, LLC, 968 F.3d at 1331–32.
366. Id. at 1331 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184).
367. Id. (citing Thales Visionix, Inc., v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1345–46
(Fed. Cir. 2017)).
368. Id.
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apply a formula or algorithm to achieve “a function which the patent
laws were designed to protect.”369
The opinion expressly rejected Trans Ova’s contention (and a basis
for the district court’s decision) that the asserted claims of the ’559
reissue patent were analogous to the claims in Parker v. Flook370 that
were held ineligible because those claims “‘simply provide[d] a new
and presumably better method for calculating alarm limit values,’ requiring nothing more than updating an alarm limit—a number—
through application of the recited formula.”371 And the panel further
understood there to be a distinction between this case and Flook because “[t]he patent application [in Flook] contained no ‘disclosure relating to the chemical processes at work, the monitoring of process
variables, or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm
system.’”372 Bringing to mind Judge Lourie’s emphasis on “specificities” in Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA
Inc.,373 the opinion distinguishes Flook by reciting the specifically recited steps in the claimed method.374 The opinion cites in support of
these distinctions the Supreme Court’s holding in Diehr that “a process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature or
a mathematical algorithm.”375 Finally, the panel distinguished these
claims from those in Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC,376 which the court held ineligible on Section 101
grounds because the Cleveland Clinic claims “used a known laboratory technique to observe a previously unknown natural phenomenon,” whereas here the ’559 reissue patent claims improved a known
laboratory technique using the application of the mathematical formula.377
With regard to the claim preclusion issue, the panel agreed with
XY that the district court erred by not comparing the claims of the
’422, ’116, and ’769 patents asserted in this action with the asserted
claims in the prior lawsuits.378 While the district court recited the
proper test (“whether the scope of the patent claims asserted in the
369.
370.
371.
inal)).
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Id. at 1332 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192).
Id.
Id. (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 585, 594–95 (1978) (alteration in origId. (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 586).
887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
XY, LLC, 986 F.3d at 1332.
Id. (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)).
859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
XY, LLC, 986 F.3d at 1332 (quoting Cleveland Clinic, 859 F.3d at 1360–61).
Id. at 1333.
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2012 and 2016 lawsuits was ‘materially’ the same”), the Federal Circuit held that the court did not provide the required comparison.379
According to the panel opinion:
Instead, the district court concluded that claim preclusion applied to XY’s ’422 and ’116 patent-infringement allegations
simply because (1) these patents issued before XY filed the
2012 lawsuit; and (2) XY’s allegations of infringement’ address the same, or substantially the same subject matter as
previously filed claims and [are] directed at a previously accused product or process.380
The panel considered the district court to have concluded, without explanation on the record, that this action was “‘part of the same transaction that prompted the 2012 [l]awsuit,’ because they were ‘related
in time, origin, and motivation’ to, and would have been ‘a convenient
trial unit’ with, the patents asserted in the 2012 lawsuit.”381 As for the
’769 patent, which had not been issued when the earlier lawsuits were
commenced, the district court believed litigation over this patent to be
“a continuation of a patent already in suit” and thus, that XY should
have moved the district court in that earlier litigation to amend its complaint to add the ’769 patent.382 The Federal Circuit considered its
precedent, SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google LLC,383 to be “materially indistinguishable” from the circumstances here.384 In that case, the district
court had upheld separate lawsuits on two related patents involving
the same cause of action solely because the two patents shared the
same specification and were both terminally disclaimed over another
prior patent.385 The Federal Circuit held that later-asserted patent
claims “could provide [a] larger claim scope to a patentee than the
earlier-asserted patent claims.”386 According to the Federal Circuit,
here “the district court did not even mention the asserted claims of the
’422, ’116, or ’769 patents, let alone analyze their scope as compared
to the scope of the patent claims asserted in XY’s 2012 lawsuit,” and
its decision in SimpleAir required comparison.387 On this basis, the
Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the case to the district court for
379. Id. (citing the District Court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss).
380. Id. (alteration in original).
381. Id. at 1333–34 (alteration in original).
382. Id. at 1334.
383. 884 F.3d 1160, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
384. XY, LLC, 986 F.3d at 1334.
385. Id. (discussing SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google LLC, 884 F.3d 1160, 1164 (Fed.
Cir. 2018)).
386. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (discussing SimpleAir, 884 F.3d at 1167).
387. Id.
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a proper analysis of the similarities and differences of the claims asserted in this action and the prior lawsuits.388
This case illustrates hopeful and less hopeful trends in the Federal
Circuit’s jurisprudence on Section 101 subject matter eligibility. On
the one hand, the decision illustrates the ease with which a district
court can be convinced by an emphasis on the underlying basis for a
claimed invention that the claims are directed to the “abstract idea”
underlying the invention. On the other hand, this decision follows a
trend of the Federal Circuit distinguishing claims directed to the abstract idea itself and those directed to an application thereof.389 But
before anyone becomes giddy at the prospect of the court finding a
reliable guide to subject matter eligibility, it must be considered that
on the same day the court handed down its decision in this case, it also
denied a petition for rehearing en banc in American Axle & Manufacturing v. Neapco Holdings LLC, which will be the subject of a subsequent post.390
J. Cardionet, LLC v. Infobionic, Inc.391
There are (at least) two ways of looking at the course of the Federal Circuit’s evolving interpretation of the Supreme Court’s subject
matter eligibility jurisprudence under Mayo392 and Alice Corp.393 One
way is to consider the court to be adrift, unable to come to a consensus
on how the law should be interpreted and thus, calling into question
the wisdom of Congress’s decision to establish a court with purportedly specialized expertise in patent law.394 Alternatively, one can analogize the exercise to sausage-making (which is more usually an analogy applied to legislation crafting) in recognition that the Supreme
Court’s Mayo/Alice jurisprudence, while enunciated as a two-part test,
has been, in practice, much less straightforward in application. Every
Federal Circuit decision influences anew the understanding and
388. Id. at 1335.
389. See, e.g., Rapid Litig. Mgmt., Ltd., v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
390. 939 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2019), reh’g denied, 966 F.3d 1347, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2020).
391. 955 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
392. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
393. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
394. See, e.g., Edward Reines, In Defense of the Federal Circuit: A Response to
Judge Wood, PAT. DOCS (Oct. 7, 2013), https://www.patentdocs.org/2013/10/in-defense-of-the-federal-circuit-a-response-to-judge-wood.html [https://perma.cc/ZZ8U
-LLWM].
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interpretation of either analysis, and the Court’s decision in Cardionet,
LLC v. Infobionic, Inc. illustrates, where one judge (Judge Dyk)
agreed with the outcome but felt compelled to write in partial dissent
on one aspect of the majority’s reasoning, illustrates anew the internal
decisions.
The case arose in litigation between the parties over cardiac monitoring technology protected under U.S. Patent No. 7,941,207.395 The
Court considered claims 1, 2, 3, 7, 10–12, and 22 to be relevant:
1. A device, comprising:
a beat detector to identify a beat-to-beat timing of cardiac
activity;
a ventricular beat detector to identify ventricular beats in
the cardiac activity;
variability determination logic to determine a variability in
the beat-to-beat timing of a collection of beats;
relevance determination logic to identify a relevance of the
variability in the beat-to-beat timing to at least one of atrial
fibrillation and atrial flutter; and
an event generator to generate an event when the variability in the beat-to-beat timing is identified as relevant to the
at least one of atrial fibrillation
and atrial flutter in light of the variability in the beat-tobeat timing caused by ventricular beats identified by the
ventricular beat detector
2. The device of claim 1, wherein the relevance determination logic is to accommodate variability in the beat-to-beat
timing caused by ventricular beats by weighting ventricular
beats as being negatively indicative of the one of atrial fibrillation and atrial flutter.
3. The device of claim 1, wherein the variability determination logic is to compare times between R-waves in three successive QRS complexes to determine the variability in the
beat-to-beat timing.
7. The device of claim 1, wherein the event generator is to
generate an event by performing operations comprising: collecting data associated with the collection of beats; and transmitting the data associated with the collection of beats to a
remote receiver.
10. The device of claim 1, wherein the relevance determination logic comprises logic to identify the relevance of the variability using a non-linear function of a beat-to-beat interval.
11. The device of claim 1, wherein the beat detector comprises a QRS detector.

395. CardioNet, 955 F.3d at 1362.
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12. The device of claim 1, further comprising a sensor that
includes two or more body surface electrodes subject to one
or more potential differences related to cardiac activity.
22. An article comprising one or more machine-readable
media storing instructions operable to cause one or more
machines to perform operations, the operations comprising:
determining a beat-to-beat variability in cardiac electrical
activity; determining a relevance of the variability over a
collection of beats to one of atrial fibrillation and atrial flutter using a non-linear function of a beat-to-beat interval; and
identifying one of an atrial fibrillation event and an atrial
flutter event based on the determined relevance, the event
being a period in time when the information content of the
cardiac electrical activity is of increased relevance to the
one of atrial fibrillation and atrial flutter[wherein] determining the relevance comprises: identifying a beat of the collection as a ventricular beat, and weighting the beat as being
negatively indicative of the one of atrial fibrillation and atrial
flutter.396
The opinion also illustrated the invention with a reproduction of Figure 10*:

396. Id. at 1365 (citing U.S. Patent No. 7,941,207 col. 12 ll. 12–36, 52–56, col.
13 ll. 5–13, col. 14 ll. 39–43 (filed Feb. 12, 2007)) (language in italics is recited in
independent claim 20, from which claim 22 depends).
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397

397. Id. at 1364.
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As the opinion sets forth, the invention permits a clinician to distinguish atrial fibrillation and atrial flutter from other forms of cardiac
arrhythmias with regard to “beat-to-beat variability in heart rate over
a series of successive heartbeats.”398 Importantly, the invention
achieves its objectives “by analyzing the beat-to-beat timing for atrial
fibrillation or atrial flutter while also taking into account the variability
in the beat-to-beat timing caused by premature ventricular beats.”399
As a consequence, “the device can more accurately distinguish atrial
fibrillation and atrial flutter from other types of arrhythmias and has
‘improved positive predictability of atrial fibrillation and atrial flutter,’” resulting (as set forth in the specification) in “a sensitivity to
[these two arrhythmias] in excess of 90% and a positive predictivity
in excess of 96%.”400
CardioNet asserted claims 1, 2, 3, 7, 10–12, and 22 against Infobionic.401 The district court dismissed CardioNet’s complaint under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that the
claims were ineligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as interpreted under the Supreme Court’s Mayo/Alice test.402 The district
court determined that, under step one of the test, the claims involved
an abstract idea, that these arrhythmias “can be distinguished by focusing on the variability of the irregular heartbeat.”403 And under step
two of the test, the district court held that “CardioNet ‘d[id] not identify improvements to any particular computerized technology’” related to detecting electrical signals relevant to cardiac function.404 This
appeal followed.
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded in an opinion by
Judge Stoll and joined in full by Judge Plager and in part by Judge
Dyk, who dissented over the terminal portion of the opinion as set
forth in further detail below.405 The opinion does not start promisingly,
citing Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC406
for the standard of review (de novo with factual issues construed in
favor of the non-moving party).407 After setting forth the details of the
398. Id. at 1362.
399. Id. at 1366.
400. Id. (alteration in original) (citing ’207 Patent at col. 3 ll. 21–26, 39–43).
401. Id. at 1364.
402. Id. at 1366.
403. Id. (citing Cardionet, LLC v. Infobionic, Inc., 348 F.3d 87, 93 (D.Mass.
2018)).
404. Id. at 1371 (alteration in original) (citing CardioNet, 348 F.3d at 93).
405. Id. at 1374.
406. 915 F.3d 743, 749 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
407. CardioNet, 955 F.3d at 1367.
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Mayo/Alice test, as well as citing Federal Circuit precedent on how
that court applies this jurisprudence,408 the opinion turned to its assessment of how this jurisprudence should apply to the claims before it.
The panel rendered its decision on step one, holding that the
claims are not merely directed to an abstract idea.409 According to the
opinion (which is unanimous on this point), the claims are directed to
an improvement in cardiac monitoring technology.410 The opinion
states:
[T]he language of claim 1 indicates that it is directed to a
device that detects beat-to-beat timing of cardiac activity, detects premature ventricular beats, and determines the relevance of the beat-to-beat timing to atrial fibrillation or atrial
flutter, taking into account the variability in the beat-to-beat
timing caused by premature ventricular beats identified by
the device’s ventricular beat detector.411
In the court’s view, the claims “focus” on specific methods for improving this technology and are not directed to an abstract idea itself
or ones that “merely invoke generic processes and machinery.”412
These conclusions, the opinion maintains, are supported by the written
description, the opinion citing portions of the specification directed to
“multiple technological improvements”:413
First and foremost, the device more accurately detects the
occurrence of atrial fibrillation and atrial flutter—as distinct
from [ventricular tachycardia] V-TACH and other arrhythmias—and allows for more reliable and immediate treatment
of these two medical conditions . . . . Indeed, the written description reports that when analyzing real-world arrhythmia
data, the device demonstrated both high ‘positive predictivity’ of, and high ‘sensitivity’ to, atrial fibrillation and atrial
flutter, meaning that it effectively avoids false positives and
false negatives, respectively, in detecting these two conditions. In addition, the device is able to identify sustained episodes of atrial fibrillation and atrial flutter that have ‘increased clinical significance.’414

408. Id.
409. Id. at 1368.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 1371.
413. Id. at 1368 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d
1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
414. Id. at 1368–69 (internal citations omitted) (The opinion recites additional aspects of the invention in support of its conclusion recited in dependent claims.).
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The opinion cites Federal Circuit precedent consistent with its
opinion here, including Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp.,415 for
the proposition that improvements to computer processing (in Visual
Memory, computer memory) could be patent-eligible.416 The opinion
notes that it was “important to our determination” in favor of patent
eligibility in Visual Memory that the specification set forth “advantages offered by” the claimed invention (supplying a seemingly
bright-line practice tip to patent prosecutors, at least for now).417 The
panel found the same type of “advantages” recited in the ’207 specification with the same result regarding patent-eligibility.418 The court
found similar support based on similar analogies in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games American Inc.419 and support for the principle that
“patent’s written description [can] inform[] our understanding of the
claims”420 in Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Techtronic Industries Co.421
The panel found the district court’s error in “the incorrect assumption that the claims are directed to automating known techniques” (as
InfoBionic argued below and maintained in its arguments to the Federal Circuit).422 But “nothing in the record” supports this view nor the
fact-finding by the district court, according to the opinion.423 The
lower court also erred, in the Federal Circuit’s view, in its consideration of the disclosure in the ’207 patent specification, where it disregarded CardioNet’s attempts to point out the relevant differences between the invention and the prior art.424 Part of this error was also
procedural because when considering a motion to dismiss, the district
court had the obligation to “construe all facts and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of CardioNet, the non-moving party,” which the
district court did not do here.425 Finally, the Federal Circuit disagreed
that the facts and issues before the court were comparable to the facts

415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.

867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
CardioNet, 955 F.3d at 1369.
Id. (citing Visual Memory, 867 F.3d at 1259–60).
Id. at 1369–70.
Id. at 1370; 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
CardioNet, 955 F.3d at 1368.
935 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
CardioNet, 955 F.3d at 1370.
Id.
Id. at 1371.
Id.
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and legal determinations in Berkheimer v. HP Inc.426 and FairWarning
IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc.,427 relied upon by the district court.428
The opinion then turns to a discussion of the question of whether
the court can decide patent eligibility or must remand to the district
court for factual assessments as to the state of the art and whether the
claims are directed merely to automating practices long used by physicians (it is here that Judge Dyk parts company with his brethren).429
The panel majority held that step one of the Mayo/Alice test asks
“whether the claims as a whole are ‘directed to’ an abstract idea, regardless of whether the prior art demonstrates that the idea or other
aspects of the claim are known, unknown, conventional, unconventional, routine, or not routine.”430
The majority opinion then distinguishes the purpose of Section
101 with the other provisions of the patent statute, sub silentio restoring the analysis to the state of the law pre-Mayo.431 While acknowledging Judge Dyk’s appreciation of statements in both Mayo and Bilski v. Kappos,432 suggesting that the state of the prior art may be
relevant, the majority notes that “in neither Bilski nor Alice did the
Court rely on an examination of the prior art as part of its step one
inquiry.”433 Instead, the majority cites the intrinsic evidence as the
proper source of information for a court to arrive at the answer to step
one of the Mayo/Alice test for determining patent eligibility.434 For the
majority, “[t]his court’s decision in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp. . . .
confirms this point,”435 and “the Alice step one inquiry in Enfish and
our other decisions began, and ended, with the patent itself,” according
to the majority.436 To the extent that there is evidence that the claims
recite “longstanding practice where there is no evidence of such practice in the intrinsic record,” the majority believes a district court can

426. 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
427. 839 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
428. CardioNet, 955 F.3d at 1371.
429. Id. at 1371–72.
430. Id. at 1372 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981) (a holding
that puts Diehr and Mayo in direct opposition should the Supreme Court deign to
decide the distinctions between the panel majority and Judge Dyk)).
431. Id.
432. 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
433. CardioNet, 955 F.3d at 1372.
434. Id. at 1373.
435. 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
436. CardioNet, 955 F.3d at 1373.
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take judicial notice thereof in appropriate circumstances.437 For the
majority, the question and its answer is clear:
Thus, we simply clarify that step one of the Alice framework
does not require an evaluation of the prior art or facts outside
of the intrinsic record regarding the state of the art at the time
of the invention. Neither Bilski, Alice, nor this court’s precedent endorses such an analysis . . . . [O]ur analysis at Alice
step one involves examining the patent claims in view of the
plain claim language, statements in the written description,
and the prosecution history, if relevant . . . . The analysis
does not require a review of the prior art or facts outside of
the intrinsic record regarding the state of the art at the time
of the invention.438
Judge Dyk disagreed. The judge rejects the majority’s contention that
its decision is consistent with Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent and disparages it as mere dicta, not being a basis for the court’s
holding here (the dissent cites to the defendant’s admission that there
were no factual disputes for the court to resolve on remand).439 For
this circuit judge, the majority’s error is “limiting the use of extrinsic
evidence to establish that a practice is longstanding,” a position that
the dissent notes that neither party took.440 Judge Dyk cites Bilski and
Alice specifically for the principle that the court considered extrinsic
evidence concerning the conventionality of claimed methods in determining that the claims in these cases were ineligible for pertaining to
an abstract idea.441 The Judge also cites Federal Circuit precedent, including Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co.,442 Affinity
Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC,443 Content Extraction &
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank,444 Berkheimer,445 and cases
cited by the majority446 in support of this position.447 In Judge Dyk’s
view, the Federal Circuit “[has] persistently looked outside the
437. Id. at 1373–74.
438. Id. at 1374.
439. Id. at 1374–76 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
440. Id. at 1375–76.
441. Id. at 1377.
442. 850 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
443. 838 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
444. 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
445. Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
446. E.g., BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
447. CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, 955 F.3d 1358, 1377–79 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(Dyk, J., dissenting).

2022]

BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT LAW TOP TEN OF 2020

471

intrinsic evidence” when deciding issues under step one of the
Mayo/Alice test.448 And, the judge finds no authority to support its
conclusion that a district court is limited to intrinsic evidence in deciding the question of whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea
under step one of the Supreme Court’s Mayo/Alice test.449
III. CONCLUSION
It begs belief that the year 2020 will be remembered primarily for
its biotechnology patent law jurisprudence—not even the top ten cases
highlighted in the pages above. The global COVID-19 pandemic,
caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, will surely overshadow all of this.
Even so, 2020 did witness at least ten notable biotechnology patent
law decisions. In these cases, the Supreme Court was silent, leaving to
the Federal Circuit issues spanning the breadth of patent legal doctrine. Inducement to infringement in ANDA cases was considered, as
was the patent eligibility of chemical isolation and concentration
claims. Obviousness of biotechnological inventions, conditions under
which temporary restraining orders are available to delay the marketing of generic medicines, and the doctrine of equivalents were explored. On a more esoteric note, the court elaborated on the “all substantial rights” test for common ownership of patents. Deference to the
USPTO, in general, and the Board, in particular, in light of the APA
and the scope of discretion appropriate for the Board were assessed.
Finally, the Federal Circuit again grappled with clarifying how the
Mayo and Alice tests should be applied in the real world.
Amidst ongoing CRISPR patent litigation between CVC and the
Broad Institute, the Nobel Committee awarded the 2020 Nobel Prize
in Chemistry to Professors Emmanuelle Charpentier and Jennifer A.
Doudna for their discovery of:
[O]ne of gene technology’s sharpest tools: the CRISPR/Cas9
genetic scissors. Using these, researchers can change the
DNA of animals, plants and microorganisms with extremely
high precision. This technology has had a revolutionary impact on the life sciences, is contributing to new cancer therapies and may make the dream of curing inherited diseases
come true.450
448. Id. at 1379.
449. Id.
450. Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Nobel Prize
in Chemistry 2020 (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/chemistry
/2020/press-release/ [https://perma.cc/U6ZY-9LK8].
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Although decisions about awarding Nobel Prizes and patent priority
are formally independent from one another, it does not stretch the imagination that the former may influence the latter. Many now wonder
whether the advances in applying CRISPR in mammalian cells made
by Professors Feng Zhang and George Church will also be recognized
one day with Nobel Prizes, some suggesting that they may become
future recipients of the Nobel Prize in Medicine.451 With respect to
these issues of patents and prizes, only time will tell, but we plan to
address relevant developments in a future biotechnology patent law
top ten article.
One additional development merits mention in light of the pandemic. Several attempts were made to create commons of patent rights
to allow any who wished to work toward the alleviation of the suffering caused by SARS-CoV-2. One notable example was the Open
COVID-19 Declaration, which was spearheaded by Professors Jorge
Contreras (University of Utah School of Law) and Mark Lemley
(Stanford Law School), and another was the coordinated patent pledge
by Harvard, MIT, Stanford, the Broad Institute of MIT, and others.452
Although it is too early to gauge the effects these patent rights commons may have had on innovation, their rapid proliferation among individuals and groups of patent owners in direct response to the pandemic suggests a willingness to coordinate or even suspend patent
rights under certain circumstances of crisis. Patent commons themselves may be an innovation whose evolution it would be wise to
watch. After all, J.R.R. Tolkien taught us that even elves, dwarves,
hobbits, wizards, ents, and humans are capable of putting aside their
vigorous proprietary differences to cooperate against a common enemy.453

451. E.g., Bobby Moon, CRISPR Scientists, Pioneers, and Leaders: The Real Heroes, SYNTHEGO (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.synthego.com/blog/crispr-scientists
[https://perma.cc/J3LT-QT28].
452. See Mark A. Lemley et al., Pledging Intellectual Property for COVID-19, 38
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1146 (2020); see also Open COVID-19 Declarers, GENO
CONCIERGE KYOTO, https://www.gckyoto.com/covid-2 [perma.cc/642H-HVXJ].
453. See generally J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS: THE RETURN OF THE
KING (1955).

